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INTRODUCTION
Just about three years ago, in light of the financial collapse of Enron, Douglas 
Baird and Robert Rasmussen dramatically announced that the U.S. privately 
negotiated reorganization regime, known worldwide simply as Chapter 11,1 is 
effectively dead.2  Two of the most notable bankruptcy law scholars of the last two 
decades, Baird and Rasmussen have continuously criticized the fundamental 
principles of Chapter 11 and have been calling for its replacement by market-based 
bankruptcy regimes.3  In The End of Bankruptcy they argued that the actual practice 
proves that most Chapter 11 cases are streamlined towards a public sale of the 
corporate debtor, either as a sale of its assets or as a sale of the equity interests 
therein.  Thus, in their eyes, the contours of Chapter 11, envisioning an internally 
negotiated reorganization plan between the debtor and its creditors, no longer rule and 
rightfully so.4  Others disagree with the generalization reflected in Baird and 
Rasmussen's contention.  For example, Lynn LoPucki has countered by contesting 
Baird and Rasmussen's argument in light of a systematic compilation of corporate 
bankruptcy data that he has accumulated over the years.5  The broad strokes with 
which Baird and Rasmussen chose to depict contemporary U.S. bankruptcy law 
notwithstanding, the practice appears to indeed mitigate the theoretical dichotomy 
between a prototypical private-bargaining bankruptcy regime and a market-based 
1 Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101- 1174.
2 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 
(2002).
3 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 Va. L. Rev. 921 (2001); Robert K. 
Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice , 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1; Robert 
K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51 
(1992); D.G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & Contemp. Problems 173 (1987); Douglas G. 
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. Legal Studies 127 (1986) (hereinafter: 
Baird, Uneasy Case).
4 Baird & Rasmussen, supra n.2. 
5 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's 
The End of Bankruptcy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 645 (2003).
3bankruptcy regime.  Yet, the strong academic debate concerning the superiority of any 
of these prototypes seems to live on.6
The academic debate surrounding the normative bankruptcy law seems at times to 
touch the most sensitive nerves of political and social science, confronting orthodox 
libertarians and modern liberals and socialists.7  Close examiners of the themes 
underlying the grand academic debate over bankruptcy law will quickly identify the 
specific flavor of U.S. bankruptcy law.  The debate has always been all about Chapter 
11.  Either a scholar liked it or opposed it all together.  In recent years, Chapter 11 has 
become a measuring stick against which various Western World countries examine 
their own bankruptcy laws.  Many countries have considered enacting a corporate 
reorganization regime which would follow, at least partially, the model of Chapter 11.  
Accordingly, the grand academic debate has been exported to other continents as well.  
With respect to this fascinating and heated academic debate, this article follows the 
realistic acknowledgement of prominent scholars such as Mark Roe and Oliver Hart, 
who understand that innovative theoretical models for bankruptcy reform, which have 
been proposed over the years, may be inapplicable for certain countries because they 
are either politically unacceptable8 or incompatible with those countries' economic 
structures.9  Thus, once one overcomes the urge to single-handedly save the world by 
introducing an ultimately triumphant bankruptcy model, the debate merits 
concretization and focus on actual countries or economic environments.  
6 With respect to U.S. law specifically, however, Omer Tene contends that the "grand" 
academic debate concerning the desirability of Chapter 11 altogether and whether its existence is at all 
justifiable has given way to a more "moderate" debate, which takes the existence of Chapter 11 as a 
given and thus addresses internal Chapter 11 issues in an attempt to improve its overall functioning. 
Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in 
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 Bank. Dev. J. 287 (2003).
7 See S. Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 Ill. L. Rev. 503, 510-
518 (describing the "great divide" in bankruptcy theory).
8 See Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 217, 236 (1998).
9 See  Oliver Hart, Different Approaches to Bankruptcy, NBER Working Paper 7921, (2000) 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7921.pdf ("It is unlikely that 'one size fits all' … Which 
procedure a country chooses or should choose may … depend on other factors, e.g., the country's 
institutional structure and legal tradition … It is important to recognize that bankruptcy reform should 
not be seen in isolation: it may be necessary to combine it with legal and other reforms, e.g., the 
training of judges, improvements in corporate governance and the strengthening of investor rights, and 
possibly even changes in the international financial system."). Indeed, the very diversity of existing 
corporate and bankruptcy laws around the world may be explained as an evolutional result of different 
preexisting legal, economic and political conditions. See Mark J. Roe, STRONG MANAGERS – WEAK 
OWNERS (1994) (developing the path dependency narrative of the evolution of contemporary corporate 
governance of publicly traded U.S. corporations); David A. Skeel, Jr., DEBT'S DOMINION – A HISTORY 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001) (analyzing the gradual development of U.S. bankruptcy law 
based on the driving forces in the American economy and politics at the time); Bruce H. Mann, 
REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002).
4This article focuses on a wide spectrum of countries, the common denominator of 
which is that their economy is considerably characterized by the dominant role the 
local banks play in financing most of the corporate activity.  The article will 
demonstrate the realistic relationship between banking dominance and the functioning 
of various bankruptcy law models.  In concentrated banking economies, banks are 
strongly involved in two phases of a typical corporate bankruptcy case.  First, they 
stand to collect from the firm as the senior secured creditors of the corporate debtor.  
Secondly, often those banks are the financing sources for the operation of the 
distressed firm while it undergoes bankruptcy and for the emergence of that firm out 
of bankruptcy.  In concentrated banking, the number of banks available for corporate 
financing is rather limited.  This makes the bank's position in bankruptcy crucial for 
the entire outcome of the case.  Unfortunately, the oligopolistic structure of the 
banking industry in such economies exposes the corporate debtors and their non-bank 
creditors to extensive risks.  As shall be elaborated later,10 the banks might use their 
stronghold over the corporate fate to extract excessive interest rates and limit their 
bankruptcy-ending financing in a conservative manner.  In addition, during 
negotiations over financing the exit from bankruptcy an ad hoc debtor-bank or 
acquirer-bank coalition might be formed which would result in the squeezing out of 
the junior creditors.  Thus, corporate bankruptcy regimes which are effectively bank 
dependent might fail to fulfill satisfactorily bankruptcy law policy.  That is, under 
such regimes it is doubtful whether the firm's resources would be allocated to their 
highest-valuing user and whether bankruptcy would maximize the return to the 
corporate creditors as a whole.11
To fully appreciate the close interaction between corporate bankruptcy and the 
structure of a country's banking industry one must first clearly categorize the various 
bankruptcy law models often compared in the academic literature.  There exist 
various bankruptcy laws around the world which include a chapter on corporate 
reorganization or rescue.  The first step often taken in pursuit of this goal is a statutory 
or judicially imposed moratorium, temporarily staying all collection actions against 
10 See Part III infra.
11 On the goals of bankruptcy law compare Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336 (1993) (emphasizing both allocative efficiency and distributive 
goals); with Barry Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343 (1997); Douglas 
G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L.J. 573 (1998); Hart, supra note 9 (all 
emphasizing efficiency as the compass for normative bankruptcy law).
5the corporate debtor.12  But beyond this immediate relief, the ultimate goal of the case 
is to effectuate a reorganization plan that would assist the firm to exit bankruptcy 
while maintaining its core business.13  This plan can be designed and constructed in a 
variety of ways. Two basic prototypes stand out in the literature on corporate 
reorganization.  The first is a reorganization plan which is negotiated privately by the 
person in control of the reorganizing firm and its creditors.  This prototype thus 
entails an endogenous reorganization, in that it involves only the debtor's
prebankruptcy actors: managers, creditors and the old equityholders.  The second 
reorganization prototype turns exogenously to the forces of the market.  Under this 
prototype, bankruptcy either utilizes a public auction of the debtor firm and awards 
the control thereof to the highest bidder14 or applies one of a variety of similar 
sophisticated mechanisms which would determine in an economic fashion the residual 
economic stakeholder in the firm.15  This prototype opens the bankruptcy case to new 
actors and allows any person, whether previously related to the debtor (holding claims 
against it or equity interests therein) or not, to participate in the crafting of a financial 
solution for the ailing debtor by bidding for its future control and operation.16
Chapter 11 has been under academic fire, especially from the law and economics 
wing, primarily because of two reasons.  First, because it leaves management with a 
superior bargaining position vis-a-vis the corporate creditors.17  Secondly, in its early 
days, Chapter 11 channeled the resolution of the corporate distress to exclusive 
bargaining between the prebankruptcy parties, rather than opening the corporate gates 
for a market evaluation of the firm.18  As noted above, the academic criticizers of 
12 For a statutory imposed automatic stay see the U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 362(a). For a 
judicially imposed moratorium see, e.g., The Insolvency Act, 1986 § 11(3) (U.K.); Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act s. 69 (Canada); The Faillissementswet § 213 (The Netherlands).
13 Unless it is concluded that the corporation has no viable business worth rescuing, in which 
case the trustee will move for converting the case to liquidation.  
14 See Part I.B.1 infra.
15 See Part I.B.2 infra.
16 Barry Adler lists two prototypes of bankruptcy law somewhat differently. The first, an ex post 
approach to corporate insolvency, empowers a court to supervise the insolvent firm and determine its 
subsequent fate, whether it be reorganized or liquidated. The alternative prototype is an ex ante
approach to corporate insolvency, under which upon the financial state of insolvency a firm strictly 
adheres to its investors' predetermined contractual undertaking as of the time of investment. Adler, 
supra n.11.
17 Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J.
1043 (1992).
18 This interpretation of Chapter 11 has been modified by the Supreme Court in 1999. The Court 
held that whenever a reorganization plan is proposed by the debtor and purports to leave value to the 
equityholders while certain creditors shall not get paid in full, the field automatically opens for the 
6Chapter 11 have been calling for its substitution by market-based mechanisms.  Yet 
the market-based models developed in the literature share a basic characteristic: they 
all entail the use of cash at the exit point upon which the firm is to emerge from 
bankruptcy.  The underlying assumption of these models was that raising the requisite 
cash is not a problematic issue.  However, subsequent papers started to question this 
simplistic assumption and raised the concern whether these models could work when 
cash is not readily available as presumed.  This paper joins those who are concerned
that cash constraints may prove certain models inadequate.  In particular, it adds to 
this skepticism the dimension of concentrated banking.  This paper will illuminate 
how the banking oligopoly may distort the efficient functioning of cash-driven models 
of corporate bankruptcy.  It will show that such regimes would simply not work in 
concentrated banking economies.  
In light of the shortcomings of the cash-driven models of bankruptcy, the 
approach I suggest herein is to adopt non-cash bankruptcy auctions as the model for 
concentrated banking economies.  Non-cash auctions enjoy the benefit of relying on 
market-based valuations of the firm.  Yet, in departing from cash payments, this 
proposed bankruptcy model may reduce the dependency of the various actors, most 
notably potential bidders, on the dominating banks' financing.  This in turn would 
level the ground for the auction by allowing bidders to value the debtor firm based on
their own valuations rather than on the banks'.  Encouraging independent valuations in 
such a fashion would, in my eyes, facilitate meeting the goal of handing the firm to its 
highest-valuing user.  It would also maximize the overall return to the prebankruptcy 
creditors as a whole.
This paper is developed as follows: Part I outlines the principal contours of the 
two prototypical corporate bankruptcies.  First, it describes the workings of privately-
negotiated bankruptcies, such as Chapter 11.  The analysis will emphasize the main 
flaw which the literature has found in this prototype, namely that it is an invitation to 
distort the valuation of the firm due to inequality of bargaining positions inside the 
bankruptcy arena.  Subsequently, the market-based models of bankruptcy are 
analyzed.  This analysis will distinguish more particularly between proposals calling 
for the outright auction of the distressed firm19 and models which have called for the 
presentation of competing proposals before confirmation of the plan. Bank of America National Trust 
and Savings Assoc. v. 203 North La Salle St. Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
19 See the Baird Proposal in Part I.B.1 infra.
7conversion of the prebankruptcy claims into new reorganization rights prior to making 
the final resolution on the firm's fate.20
Part II will temporarily abandon the bankruptcy discourse in order to set the stage 
and introduce the specific nature of concentrated banking economies.  The 
phenomenon of concentrated banking has been the subject of various economic 
studies in recent years.  A main theme in this research is trying to address the question 
whether such a structure of a country's financial market is overall good or bad. Not 
surprisingly, the opinions have been split over this matter.  But what the literature can 
tell us is, that even assuming that the overall effect of concentrated banking is 
constructive, it bears nonetheless potential risks for borrowing firms.  The most 
apparent risk is the limited supply of financing sources and difficulties it creates for 
developing businesses by entrepreneurs.  
This paper will avoid taking sides in the concentrated banking debate.  Rather, it 
wishes to relate the risks associated with concentrated banking to the functioning of 
various bankruptcy models.  This task is undertaken in Part III of the paper.  This part 
integrates the various models of bankruptcy discussed previously into the melting pot 
of a concentrated banking economy and tests the outcome.  It shows that cash-driven 
models of bankruptcy are likely to fail as the bank's position as the ultimate and sole 
suppliers of financing for the bankruptcy resolution would adversely affect this 
resolution.  The banks enjoy a close-knitted oligopoly in which the financing terms of 
one are easily revealed by the others.  The paper will show that the joint interest of the 
banks is to reduce the financing for acquiring control of a distressed firm and to set 
that financing at a level which is a function of the senior lender's prebankruptcy claim.  
This limitation will at times deny identifying the highest valuing-user.  Thus, cash-
driven bankruptcy models are simply tailored for economies in which actors in the 
market enjoy a diversity of financing sources, but are incompatible with the 
conditions of concentrated banking.
As a result of the failure of cash-driven bankruptcy models, Part IV proposes to 
adopt a soft version of exogenous bankruptcy.  That is, the proposal endorses the 
concept of subjecting the elusive value of the distressed firm to market forces.  Thus, 
an open and unlimited auction for the control of the firm should take place.  However, 
given the severe financing obstacle bidders face in concentrated banking economies, 
20 See the Bebchuk Proposal and the AHM Proposal in Part I.B.2 infra
8this paper calls for allowing non-cash auctions to take place.  In such auctions, 
bidders would value the firm without necessarily having to raise cash upfront.  The 
winning bidder would pay off the firm's debts to its creditors through installment 
payments or through the conversion of part of those claims into equity rights in the 
firm.  Such a system would encourage bidding for the control of the firm.  The 
enhanced competition is likely to generate more reliable valuations of the firm.  
Nonetheless, the proposal also clarifies that because this system does not employ 
actual realization of the firm's assets, the bids and the valuations reflected therein 
must be forwarded to the approving vote of the firm's creditors.
I. Corporate Reorganizations: A Tale of Two Prototypes
Bankruptcy practice exhibits two distinct types of corporate resurrection.  One 
employs endogenous efforts of the debtor and its creditors to overcome the existing 
financial crisis by rearranging the creditors' prebankruptcy claims and converting 
parts thereof into newly issued debt or equity instruments.  This type shall be referred 
to as private bargaining reorganization. The other relies on exogenous forces to step in 
and acquire the control of the corporate enterprise while paying off the prebankruptcy 
claims. This type shall be referred to as market based corporate reorganization.  This 
part examines the contours of each of these reorganization schemes and outlines their 
distinctive characteristics.  In order to emphasize the fundamentals of each 
reorganization prototype and its relative strengths or weaknesses the analysis will 
assume, at this point, that all markets are alike and disregard the specific 
characteristics of different types of economies around the world.  Thus, any country is 
assumed to be ripe for adopting either the endogenous or the exogenous 
reorganization regime.  Later, in Parts III and IV of this paper, the assumption of 
homogeneity of countries shall be relaxed in favor of the real world's diversity of 
economic systems.  The compatibility of each of the two prototypes to certain types of 
economies shall then be examined more specifically.
A. Private Bargaining
1. Crafting a Reorganization Plan
In a private bargaining reorganization, the debtor and its creditors engage in 
extensive negotiations towards the development of a comprehensive reorganization 
plan.  Reorganization plans contain two major parts.  The first is a business plan for 
9the future operation of the reorganized firm.  The second part deals with the 
retirement of the corporate outstanding debt.  The plan must specify the method of 
payment, whether by means of a cash payment, installment payments, or conversion 
of debt to equity interests, including all modifications to the original rights of the 
creditors (i.e. the prepetition claims) as a result of the payment means utilized 
thereunder.  The trademark of a private bargaining reorganization is that, unlike in a 
liquidation case, there is no actual sale of the corporate assets (whether as a whole or 
piecemeal).21  The corpus of the corporate business remains intact.  While the capital 
structure of the company is restructured, no realization of the assets ever takes place.22
The restructuring of the corporate capital necessitates a valuation of the corporation.  
The valuation is imperative in connection with the second element of a reorganization 
plan.  That is, a valuation of the corporation is required for determining the payoffs of 
the prebankruptcy claims.  In bankruptcy, the satisfaction of the creditors' approved 
claims is based on the absolute priority rule.23  Under this rule, any distribution of 
value to a group of creditors may be done only if there is enough value remaining in 
the corporate assets after full satisfaction of the senior ranking claims.24  The greater 
the value assigned to the corporation, the farther the distribution to creditors goes.  
2. The Valuation Distortion
Absent actual realization of the corporate assets through a liquidation sale, the 
valuation of the debtor corporation remains an inexact science at best.  There are no 
verifiable monetary figures extracted from an actual sale of the assets.25  Rather, 
valuation is a matter of intelligent probabilistic estimation of the debtor's future 
performance.26  It is based on the analysis of economic experts.  Such analyses are 
21 See Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 201-212 (1986); 
Douglas G.Baird, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 198-206 (3rd ed. 2001).
22 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 Harv. L. Rev  775, 
778 (1988) (hereinafter: Bebchuk, New Approach); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of 
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 314 (1993); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra n.3, at 
127-128.
23 The phrase "absolute priority rule" was first coined in James C. Bonbright & Milton M. 
Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 
28 Colum .L. Rev. 127 (1928).
24 For a statutory expression of the absolute priority rule, see Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b).
25 David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 
Am. U.L. Rev 63, 70-74 (1991).
26 Cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 946 (2nd Cir. 1942) ("The 
fallacy in that argument stems largely from lack of recognition of the eely character of the word 'value'. 
It is a bewitching word which, for years, has disturbed mental peace and caused numerous useless 
debates. Perhaps it would be better for the peace of men's minds if the word were abolished. Reams of 
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ordered by interested parties.  Unfortunately, the experience of recent years proves 
more than ever before that the use of experts' analyses to substantiate a valuation of a 
corporation is an invitation to introduce self-interested valuations that serve the 
strategic cause of the party ordering the valuation.27  Indeed, to the extent the valuing 
person lacks complete independence in its valuation of the corporation, its economic 
ties with the ordering party, its compensation for the valuation, or its own stake in the 
entity being valued, is liable to compromise its valuation.28  In the context of 
valuation for the purpose of reorganization, the various creditors and the 
equityholders face conflicting interests in this respect, and thus invite subjective, self-
serving, strategic valuations of the debtor.29  The senior creditors seek a 
conservatively low valuation of the debtor corporation, because this would make them 
the exclusive economic owners of the reorganized corporation.30  On the other hand, 
good paper and gallons of good ink have been wasted by those who have tried to give it a constant and 
precise meaning… And there, as almost always, 'value' involves a conjecture, a guess, a prediction, a 
prophecy… 'Like all values, as the word is used by the law, it depends largely on more or less certain 
prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real … if later the prophecy turns out false than when 
it comes out true.' Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155, 49 S.Ct. 291, 292, 73 L.Ed. 
647.")
27 Stephen J. Leocock, The Anatomy of Valuing Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Pursuing 
the Phantom of Objectivity in the New Millennium, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 161, 165 (2001); Park 
McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need to Shareholder Self Help in an Age of 
Formalistic  Proceduralism, 46 Emory L.J 163, 205-212 (1997); David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors 
and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 Am. U.L. Rev 63, 70-74 .(1991); Bruce A. 
Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 
120 (1991).
28 This is perhaps the greatest lesson the entire accounting practice has learned first-hand from 
the Enron debacle.  See "Who Fiddled What? 'Errors of Judgment' are Piling Up at Andersen", The 
Economist, Dec. 22, 2001;  David Barboza, Enron  Inquiry Now Focusing on Valuations, The New 
York Times, May 13, 2002; Joseph Fuller and Michael Jensen, End the Myth-Making and Return to 
True Analysis: Viewpoint Joseph Fuller and Michael Jensen: Analysts' Forecasts Have Become Too 
Powerful and it is Time for Companies to Stop Colluding with their Inflated Expectations, Financial 
Times (London, England), Jan. 22, 2002; Harvey Rice, The Fall of Enron;
Sources Say Assets of Driller Inflated, The Houston Chronicle, Sept. 22, 2002; Connor Dignam, 
Choosing the Winners in the Brand Value Game: Cash Valuations Alone do not Fully Reflect the 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the World's Top Brands, Financial Times, Aug. 6, 2002; Andrew Hill and 
Sheila McNulty, Energy Groups under Renewed Pressure Mark-To-Market Accounting, Financial 
Times, Jan. 31, 2002; Peter Martin, Always Expect the Unexpected: Enron's Collapse Should Remind 
Us that No Accounting or Valuation Technique Can Disguise the Inherent Riskiness of Business,
Financial Times, Jan. 29, 2002. 
29 On the creditors' subjective valuation see John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty and the Law 
of Corporate Reorganizations,  67 Fordham L. Rev. 2939, 2985 (1999).
30 This strategic calculation by a senior creditor is applicable when the creditor assumes that its 
claim might be valued lower than the firm's aggregate value and that the plan allocates equity interests 
in exchange for the prebankruptcy claims. See Adler, supra n.22, at 318. In the case of a secured 
creditor who is concerned that its collateral is likely to be valued lower than its claim (that is, an 
undersecured claim) and that the payoff will be in debt instruments, the creditor's interest is to attempt 
inflating the value of the collateral, in order to increase its secured claim and decrease its unsecured 
deficiency claim. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2386, 2398-2401 (2001).
11
junior claimants and even more so the old equityholders are in search of a high 
valuation of the corporation, in hope of retaining a stake in the reorganized corporate 
capital.31  Thus, privately negotiated reorganization plans entail the risks of over- or 
undervaluation, depending on the particular valuation introduced.32  Either way, the 
distribution of value amongst the various classes of claims is liable to be distorted and 
fail to reflect the true economic stakes in the corporation.  Privately negotiated 
reorganization plans increase the probability of transfer of value from one class to 
another based on the relative bargaining leverage each negotiating party holds.  In 
addition, self-interested valuations violate the economic goal of placing the corporate 
assets in the hands of their most efficient user.33  In short, the valuation distortion 
undermines the reliability, the efficiency and the fairness of the privately negotiated 
reorganization scheme as a means for resolving the financial crisis of a corporation.  
Nonetheless, the valuation distortion in private bargaining reorganizations may be 
ameliorated by entrusting the entire valuation process in the exclusive hands of an 
independent person, free from any biases of the old management, shareholders or 
classes of creditors.  Indeed, in various insolvency regimes around the world an 
appointed trustee is the person that is required to evaluate the corporation and propose 
a payment plan based on the corporation's assigned value.34  The trustee is considered 
an objective party as it is free of preexisting economic stakes in the corporation.35
31 Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 13, 
31 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization,  83 
Colum. L. Rev. 527, 547-548 (1983); Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 22, at 779; Robert F. Reilly, 
Valuation - Big Businesses vs. Small, 1995 ABI JNL Lexis 126 (1995); Chaim J. Fortgang  & Thomas 
M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1061, 1063-1066 (1985); J. Bradley Johnston, 
The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J  213, 264-265 (1991).
32 Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 31, at 1105-1107; Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 22, at 
780; Bradley, The Bankruptcy Bargain, supra note 31, at 241. 
33 Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & Econ. 633, 634 (1993) 
(hereinafter: Baird, Auctions Revised); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra n.3, at 133. 
34 See, e.g., in the U.K., G. Lightman & G. Moss, THE LAW OF RECEIVERS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS OF  COMPANIES, 457-459 (2000); 2-21 COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
INSOLVENCY GUIDE 21.05 [d][i][vi] (Richard F. Broude ed., 1999); Robert R. Pennington, 
PENNINGTON'S CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, 327 (1991); M. Phillips & J. Goldring, Rescue and 
Reconstruction, 15 Insolv. Int. 75, 75-78 (2002). Cf. F. Tolmie, INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE AND 
PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW, 107-112 (1998).
35 The identity of the person or group controlling the corporation while its undergoing 
reorganization has been recently acknowledged as a central issue in analyzing the efficacy of any 
particular reorganization regime. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3. See also John Armour, Brian 
R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy 
Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1699 (2002); David A. Skeel, Creditors' 
Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003); D. Hahn,
Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganizations, 4 J. Corp. L. Stud. 117 (2004).
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This position a trustee enjoys ostensibly portrays a valuation it ordered as a bias-free 
valuation of the financially distressed corporation.36
B. Market Based Bankruptcies
1. Public Auctions
a. Auctions of Distressed Firms in Practice
The alternative reorganization prototype is one that in lieu of privately bargaining 
a plan between the preexisting management, equityholders and creditors, puts the firm 
up for sale on the market and seeks the highest bid thereon.  The proceeds of the sale 
paid by the winning bidder are used to pay off the prebankruptcy claims based on the 
absolute priority rule.  Indeed, such an approach to corporate bankruptcy can be found 
in practice in Sweden.37  A Swedish insolvent firm may propose a compromise plan, 
but only with its unsecured creditors.  Because this scheme is partial in its nature and 
excludes the treatment of secured creditors and priority claims, these creditors can 
refuse full payment to the unsecured creditors and thus frustrate the effectuating of a 
workable plan.  Thus, it is seldom used.38  Rather, the common alternatives available 
for insolvent firms are to arrange a sale of the firm’s assets and repay the creditors out 
of the proceeds received therefrom.  Two paths of sales are available.  The first path is 
a “pre-pack sale”, which is arranged out-of-court by the management and approved by 
the secured creditors. Upon the execution of the sale, the firm files for bankruptcy 
primarily to allow junior creditors to oppose the sale in court, overturn it and 
effectuate an auction in lieu.39  The second path of sale takes place through a court-
controlled bankruptcy case.  Upon the filing for bankruptcy, an automatic stay is 
imposed against all debt collection, including the foreclosure on collateral.  In 
addition, fresh financing and trade credit are accorded super-priority status.40  A 
court-appointed trustee takes control of the firm in order to auction its assets.  The 
36 Oliver Hart, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 174-8 (1995).
37 Due to my nonexistent skills in deciphering any Swedish text, the description of the Swedish 
model that unfolds herein is based on its description in English in B. Espen-Eckbo & Karin S. 
Thorburn, Overbidding vs. Fire-Sales in Bankruptcy Auctions, ¶ 3.1 (hereinafter: Espen-Eckbo & 
Thorburn, Fire-Sales), http://ssrn.com/abstract=299384 (2002).
38 Espen-Eckbo & Thorburn note that only 4 cases of successful compositions were reported in 
comparison to 300 bankruptcy filings for 1,650 financially distressed firms. See Karin S. Thorburn, 
Bankruptcy Auctions: Costs, Debt Recovery, and Firm Survival, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 337, 342 (referring to 
B. Espen-Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, unpublished manuscript  (2000).)
39 Empirically, pre-pack sales are hardly ever overturned. Espen-Eckbo & Thorburn, Fire-Sales, 
supra n.37.
40 In practice, firms generate most of their bankruptcy financing through trade credit rather than 
through financial credit. Id.
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auction normally takes place within several weeks of the bankruptcy filing.  The 
firm’s assets are auctioned by the trustee either as a going-concern, usually in the 
form of a merger into a surviving corporation, or piecemeal.  The consideration 
offered in the auction must be in cash.  The creditors are paid out of the auction’s 
proceeds in strict adherence to the absolute priority rule.
b. The Virtues of Bankruptcy Auctions
i. Obtaining the True Value of the Firm
An auction approach to the solution of corporate distress is predicated on pure 
economic theory.  Classic auction theory, developed by Vickrey and later Weber and 
Milgrom, holds that auctions, whether conducted as open English auctions, Dutch 
auctions, or sealed bids auctions,41 generate the true value of the good being 
auctioned.42  Bulow and Klemperer showed that the competition existent in an auction 
makes this procedure preferable to a privately negotiated sale, notwithstanding the 
bargaining skills and control of the seller.43  Under auction theory, an auction-based 
bankruptcy system substitutes a market valuation of a debtor corporation for a 
mechanism of private bargaining over the value between the existing groups of 
investors alone.44
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, prominent law and economics scholars, the 
most vocal of whom has been Douglas Baird, advocated consistently for the repeal of 
the U.S. Chapter 11’s private bargaining approach to reorganization in favor of an 
auction regime.45  Indeed, valuing the future performance of a corporation is complex.  
41 An English auction is an open, ascending auction, where the price is successively raised until 
eventually a bidder wins as the highest bidder. A Dutch auction is the reverse: an open, descending 
auction, where the price is successively reduced by the auctioneer until the first bidder calls out that she 
is willing to meet that price. A sealed-bid auction is one where each bidder places her bid without 
knowledge of the others' bids, and the highest bidder wins the auction.  That winner will pay its 
original highest bid (under the first-price sealed-bid model) or the second highest bidder's bid (under 
the second-price sealed-bid model). See Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 
J. Econ. Surveys 227 (1999).
42 See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. 
Fin. 8 (1961); Robert J. Weber & Paul R. Milgrom, A Theory of Auction and Competitive Bidding, 50 
Econometrica 1089 (1982); Paul Milgrom, Auction and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. of Econ. Persp. 3 
(1989). See also Robert Wilson, A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition, 44 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 511 
(1977) (claiming that in sealed bids, assuming true competition, the seller will receive the true value 
even if that value is not known prior to the bidding).
43 Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auction Versus Negotiation, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 180 
(1996).
44 Jackson, supra note 21, 221-24; Adler, supra note 11, at 347 ; Roe, supra note 31 at 559. 
45 The classic papers developing an auction approach to corporate bankruptcy are Baird, Uneasy 
Case, supra n.3; Jensen, supra n. 31, at 29-32. Baird's auction approach for bankruptcy received later 
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It involves the making of assumptions, projecting the income stream based on those 
assumptions, and then multiplying the projected income by the probabilities of 
meeting the projections.  Under auction theory, the optimal valuation of the firm 
would be obtained by leaving the valuation task to the forces of the market.  Put 
simply, the auction-based bankruptcy proponents call for placing the firm in the hands 
of the user that assigns the highest value thereto.  That user may be one or more of the 
groups of creditors of the corporation, the old equityholders, or a third-party.  A 
privately-bargained plan allocates the corporate assets solely to the persons with 
whom the proponent negotiated and struck a deal.  Usually, those persons will be 
preexisting creditors or equityholders.  But such persons may not be the best users of 
the corporate assets.  Obtaining the efficient allocation of resources in the context of 
corporate reorganization requires a process in which any prospective user of the 
corporate resources may bid and propose to take control of the corporation.  A general 
invitation to bid on the corporate assets and their future use is embodied in the process 
of an auction. 46
ii. Avoiding a Judicial Valuation of the Firm
The proponents of the auction model of corporate reorganization highlight a
crucial institutional shortcoming of the privately-bargained reorganization prototype.  
In a private-bargaining reorganization, after the proponent of the plan presented the 
underlying valuation on which the plan is based and although the creditors vote on the 
proposed plan, the ultimate decision on the acceptance of the plan with its underlying 
valuation is to be made by a bankruptcy judge upon confirmation of the plan.47 In 
contrast, in an auction-based regime, no institution is called upon to value the 
support from Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis 
and Practical Guidance, 18 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 159 (1998). Cf. William H. Meckling, Financial 
Markets, Default and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 L. & Contemp. Prob. 13, 37-38 (1977).
46 Frank Easterbrook casts some serious doubts concerning the theory that auctions are supreme 
to reorganization under chapter 11 in reducing social costs. Easterbrook points to the lack of resort to 
(prebankruptcy) auctions by creditors and the complete disregard of the auction alternative during the 
extensive and elaborate legislation process of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, including by 
representatives lending institutions as indicators that despite the academic call for auctioning insolvent 
firms, the legal chapter 11 course might be economically preferable. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is 
Chapter 11 Efficient, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 411 (1990). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982) (arguing that given the sunk costs 
of an initial bidder for the control of a firm in a tender offer, imposing on management an affirmative 
duty to auction the firm following this initial bid adversely affects ex ante the incentives of any 
prospective (initial) bidder to invest in information for acquisition of the firm and thus reduces efficient 
monitoring of the firm's agents, to the detriment of investors).
47 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a) (U.S.); Insolvency Act, 1986 § 4A(6) (U.K.).
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corporate debtor.  That mission is left exclusively to the free forces of the market.  
Many have questioned the competence of judges to make such complex valuation 
judgments and accordingly support a market-based bankruptcy prototype.48
Nonetheless, certain recent articles counter this argument by contending that holding 
market-based sales in bankruptcy entail expensive and lengthy procedures comparable 
to the average cost and time a typical Chapter 11 bargaining takes49 and that such 
sales are conducted as fire-sales generating prohibitively low returns for the 
creditors.50
iii. Countering Management's Control Leverage
By placing the firm for sale on the open market an auction-based bankruptcy 
regime achieves another, albeit related, constructive goal.  It removes much of the 
distorted leverage that management and equityholders gain by entering the gates of 
the U.S. private-bargaining regime of Chapter 11.51  When an auction takes place, any 
group of interest, including creditors, old equityholders or management is subject to 
the exact same rules of the bidding game as any outside bidder.  Put differently, in an 
auction regime management and equityholders do not gain any personal advantages 
that other groups of interest would be denied.52  In an auction regime, commencing 
reorganization does not provide the old management a safe-haven in which they enjoy 
the upper hand in negotiations and may stall the proceedings until they are likely to 
obtain the creditors' concessions and emerge once again at the helm of the corporate 
48 Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J. L. Econ. & Org.
(2001);Baird, supra note 11; Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits 
of the Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 75 (1995); But see Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in 
Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 559 (2001) (arguing that 
the drafting of the Bankruptcy Code to include muddy rules that leave wide discretion to the 
bankruptcy judges increases the costs of non-cooperative behavior and thus promotes a cooperative 
resolution of the debtor’s financial distress).
49 See Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy, Yale ICF Working Paper
No. 04-13 (2004), full text available for download at http://ssrn.com/abstract=523562.
50 See Todd Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial 
Aircraft Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939 (1998). Cf. Per Stromberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market 
Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. Fin. 2641 (2000).
51 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in 
Corporate Reorganization, 8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 253, 255-6 (1992) (arguing that such distortions 
include: (a) equityholders' ability to prolong the proceedings and threaten the recovery of the creditors 
by exposing the firm to additional costs and losses while in bankruptcy, and (b) their extracting value 
in exchange for foregoing their "option rights" to receive value from the debtor (this "option" exists 
because the value of the firm remains uncertain as there is no actual realization of assets in 
reorganization)).
52 Cf. Barry E. Adler & George G. Triantis, The Aftermath of North LaSalle Street, 70 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 1225, 1233-1238 (2002) (discussing the strong benefits management can enjoy by deviations from 
absolute priority).
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business.  Once commenced, the auction regime leads to an open competition among 
bidders over the control of the firm.  It follows, then, that the early decision whether 
to enter reorganization or liquidation is free of any strategic planning by management 
and equityholders.  Any dilemma, involving genuine business or strategic 
considerations, is eliminated.  The only decision to be made is to enter bankruptcy.  
What course the bankruptcy case will follow is clear.  The corporation will be 
auctioned, and the bidders will determine whether the corporation will be sold as a 
going-concern or whether its assets will be sold piecemeal.  However, it should be 
noted that the neutralization of private management's benefits in reorganization is not 
limited exclusively to an auction based bankruptcy regime.  Although a management-
controlled private bargaining reorganization, as Chapter 11, entails the management 
leverage problem, theoretically a trustee-controlled private bargaining regime quashes 
this problem as well.53
2. The Homogeneous Options Proposals
One of the more troubling features of bankruptcy bargaining is that it entails a 
bargaining among divergent groups of claims and interests.54  Based on their senior or 
junior priority of distribution, these groups hold heterogeneous interests which are 
likely to be reflected in their bargaining positions.55  Arguably, the heterogeneity 
problem impairs the integrity of bargaining over a bankrupt firm as well as its 
efficacy.  Indeed, in his call for auctions, Baird makes it quite clear that auctions, as a 
market based valuation system, not only facilitate the allocation of the corporate 
assets to their most efficient user (the highest bidder), but also separate the question of 
distribution of the proceeds of the sale among the corporate creditors from the 
question of future deployment of the assets.56  Thus, auctions remove the 
53 See Hahn, supra n.35, at 132-133. Cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of 
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325 (1998) (distinguishing between 
management-displacing and management-controlled bankruptcy regimes).
54 Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 
51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97 (1984).
55 See Part I.A.1 supra.
56 Baird, Auctions Revised, supra note 33, at 638. But see Sugato Bhattacharyya & Rajdeep 
Singh, The Resolution of Bankruptcy by Auction, 54 J. Fin. Econ. 269 (1999) (criticizing this argument 
and emphasizing that "each market-based sales mechanism has its own specific distributional 
attributes, over which different claimants have distinct preferences. Just as current bankruptcy 
resolution procedures engender claimant conflicts over reorganization plans, the proposed auction-
based resolutions, which seek to maintain adherence to APR [absolute priority rule – D.H.], will 
engender claimant conflicts over specific selling mechanisms." Thus, they assert that "given inherent 
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heterogeneity problem from the resolution of a bankrupt firm's fate.  Other scholars 
have offered other innovative models for corporate bankruptcy, which are intended 
primarily to overcome the valuation distortions and heterogeneous interests that are 
inherent in private bargaining.  Mark Roe proposed that a bankrupt firm would issue 
ten percent (10%) of new common stock through the market and extrapolate its value 
through this issue.57  Lucian Bebchuk offered another innovative approach, under 
which upon bankruptcy the original rights of all existing claimholders and 
equityholders of the firm would be extinguished.  Rather, the senior secured claims 
would receive in lieu all the equity stake in the firm, while the junior creditors and 
equityholders would be issued buy-out options.  Thereupon, starting with the most 
junior class (that is, old equityholders) each class would be entitled to exercise its 
options, under the terms of which the holders may buy out the more senior classes at 
the value of latter's original claims.  Should a class abstain from exercising its option 
it would lose any stake it had in the firm and the rights would shift to the senior class 
ranking immediately ahead of the abstaining class.58  Building on the Bebchuk 
Proposal, Aghion, Hart and Moore proposed to combine the buy-out options issued to 
existing claimholders and equityholders with a subsequent vote by the new 
equityholders (that is, the exercised options) on market bids for the bankrupt firm.59
Both the Bebchuk Proposal and the AHM Proposal convert all the divergent claims 
and interests into a newly homogeneous class of equity interests.  By so doing these 
Proposals join Baird's auction model in that they dispense with the heterogeneity 
problem.
II. Concentrated Banking and Corporate Financing
inter-claimant conflict in this regard, it is likely that an independent court can add value to the process, 
over and above what could be contractually achieved by the affected parties.")
57
 Roe, supra note 31 (hereinafter: The Roe Proposal) See also Roe, supra n.8 (asserting the 
general preference for market-based regimes).
58 Bebchuk, supra note 22 (hereinafter: The Bebchuk Proposal).
59 Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J. L. 
Econ. & Org. 523 (1992); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, Improving Bankruptcy 
Procedure, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 849 (1994) (hereinafter: The AHM Proposal). AHM later published an 
alternative version to their principle proposition. Under the alternate version, the newly issued buy-out 
options would apply only to former unsecured claims and equityholders, while the old secured claims 
would remain intact. In addition, an official bankruptcy appointee would be appointed (a trustee or 
receiver) who would then propose a single reorganization plan to the (new) equityholders of the firm, 
with no active auction soliciting external bids taking place. Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John 
Moore, Insolvency Reform in the UK: A Revised Proposal, 11 Insol. L. & Practice 4 (1995).
18
The previous part deliberately assumed that countries around the world 
operate under similar economic conditions.  Thus, the theoretical analysis of the 
various bankruptcy models disregarded specific idiosyncratic characteristics of 
specific economies.  This part relaxes the homogeneous economies assumption.  In 
particular, it differentiates between economies based on their characteristic channels 
for financing business firms.  The following part will build on the characteristics of 
certain markets developed in this part and examine which of the various models of 
bankruptcy law is most compatible for those markets.
A. Concentrated Banking Economies
The structure of local capital markets varies significantly.  Certain markets are 
more developed while others are considered developing.  Corporate governance 
around the world is divergent and, despite an international agenda for reform and 
implementation of prototypical principles,60 is largely shaped by the conditions and 
the characteristics of the particular capital markets in which its rules apply.61
Economic studies highlight the distinctions between concentrated and dispersed 
ownership markets.62  Dispersed ownership markets are capital markets in which, by 
and large, firms raise capital through an active stock exchange from dispersed 
investors, ranging from small private investors to large financial institutions.  In such 
markets, the dispersion of investors encourages competition among the financing 
sources of firms.  That is, the basic conditions pertaining to a firm's access to finance 
are such that it can shop around between different types of investors and different 
types of financial instruments for its most appropriate package of financing.  Yet 
many small economies around the world lack these attributes.63  Such economies 
60 See, e.g., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. For trends of reform within leading OECD 
members, see Corporate Governance in OECD Member Countries: Recent Developments and Trends 
(Revised) (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/2/1932036.pdf .
61 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737 
(1997); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and 
Barrieers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERSITY 23 (J. McCahery et al. ed., Oxford 2002)
62 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership 
Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999).
63 Beck, Demigruc-Kunt and Levine find that poorly developed markets are found primarily in 
traditional French civil law countries, while traditional common law countries enjoying strong 
protection of shareholders rights, good accounting regulations and low levels of corruption tend to be 
more market based countries.  Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, Law, 
Endowments and Finance, 70 J. Fin Econ 137 (2003).
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often correspond to the concentrated ownership market prototype.64    Moreover, these 
markets are characterized by a capital market in which a few financial institutions 
dominate the supply of finance to the entire local market.  Because these financial 
institutions are often banks, and the capital supply is primarily intermediate debt 
instruments,65 these markets are referred to as concentrated banking markets66 or bank 
dominated markets.67  Indeed, there is a strong correlation between concentrated
banking and the lack of a well-developed securities market in a given economy.68
64 The tentative impression from the discussion of various corporate governance regimes might 
be that it is an issue that is relevant for listed corporations, whose stock is publicly traded through an 
active stock exchange. Yet, from a normative and policy perspective, the structure of a market's 
corporate governance bears important ramifications for closely-held corporations as well, as it affects 
their potential to raise equity capital by going public. See Charles Oman, Steven Fries & Willem 
Buiter, Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and Emerging-Market Economies, OECD 
DEVELOPMENT CENTRE Policy Brief No. 23 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/49/28658158.pdf.
65 Banks are considered intermediaries between the firms in a market and the capital required for 
the latter's operations. Correspondingly, bank financing is dubbed intermediate debt, as opposed to 
bonds and other securities issued by the firm or direct lending by non-bankers – the non-intermediated 
debt. See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 Rev. Econ. 
Stud. 393 (1984).
66 See Mark J. Roe, Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10, 44
(1991); Eric J. Gouvin, Cross-Border Bank Branching Under the NAFTA: Public Choice and the Law 
of Corporate Groups, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. 257,258 (1999); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Potential Risks of 
Nationwide Consolidation in the Banking Industry: A Reply to Professor Miller, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1133, 
1143-4 (1992). Cf. Eric J. Gouvin, Banking in North America: The Triumph of Public Choice over 
Public Policy, 32 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1, 3 (1998) (describing concentrated banking markets as "markets in 
which banking organizations are free to offer a broad range of financial services"); Eric J. Gouvin, The 
Political Economy of Canada's "Widely Held" Rule for Large Banks, 32 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 391 
(2001); E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 
77 Iowa L. Rev. 957 (1992)
67 For a focused comparative study on bank domination in the U.S., Japan and Germany, see 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A 
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (1995). See 
also Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 
102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993) (observing the control of German and Japanese firms by large domestic 
financial institutions such as the banks through the holding of large blocks of stocks of these firms). 
For a general empirical comparison between market-based and bank-based financial systems, and the 
relation between each system and economic development of countries, see Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross 
Levine, Bank-based and Market-based Financial Systems - Cross-Country Comparisons, The World 
Bank Finance Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper WPS 2143 (July 1999), 
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/323.pdf. 
68 See, e.g., Amy Chunyan Wu, PRC's Commercial Banking System:
Is Universal Banking a Better Model?, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 623, 638 (1999) (stating that 
"Corporate sectors throughout Asia rely more on bank finance and less on equity than Western 
markets. China's enterprises are not exceptions.") William L. Horton, Jr. The Perils of Universal 
Banking in Central and Eastern Europe, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 683, 694 (1995) (describing the limited 
function the German securities market plays in financing the local private sector as compared to the 
prevalent bank financing); Skeel & Cheffins, supra note 35 (discussing the equilibrium between 
concentrated equity ownership and concentrated debt markets on one hand, and dispersed equity 
ownership and dispersed (non-intermediated) debt markets on the other hand); Mark G. Guzman, Bank 
Structure, Capital Accumulation and Growth: A Simple Macroeconomic Model, 16 Econ. Theory 421 
(2000).
For a meticulously constructed spreadsheet compiling data from 175 countries around the world 
concerning, inter alia, the relative size of banking activity compared to local securities markets, see 
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Bank financing provides the lion's share of the total financing in these markets.  Thus, 
the dependency of players in the local commercial activity on bank financing could 
not be stronger.
B. The Efficacy and Perils of Concentrated Banking 
The ubiquity of concentrated banking begs the question whether such a market 
structure is efficient or rather value-reducing for an economy.  Based on data 
compiled primarily in the U.S., early studies that examined the relationship between 
concentrated banking and lending efficacy reached conflicting conclusions.  For 
example, Guzman concluded that overall a bank monopoly is liable to lead to credit 
rationing and manipulate the rates of interest on loans and deposits.69  Also, Cetorelli 
argued that strong banking concentration presents entry barriers for entrepreneurs in 
non-financial sectors.70  In short, these studies concluded that highly concentrated 
banking adversely affects the credit market and increases the overall cost of capital.  
Yet, other studies highlighted the positive effects of concentration on the banks' 
efficient screening of borrowers' credit profiles and the banks' overall stability.  For 
example, Petersen and Rajan emphasize that in concentrated banking, banks are more 
likely to assist small firms in financing as the banks develop relationships with those 
firms and plan on recovering the profits at a later stage.71   Marquez points to more 
efficient borrower screening in concentrated banking and the negative effects of 
information asymmetries and low screening (adverse selection) in dispersed 
banking.72 In addition, Beck, Demigruc-Kunt and Levine demonstrate that 
Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, A New Database on Financial Development and 
Structure, The World Bank Finance Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 
WPS 2146 (July 1999, as updated 2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/structure_database.xls; 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/607_wps2146.pdf. 
69 Guzman, supra n.68 .
70 Nicola Cetorelli, Real Effects of Bank Competition, 36 J. of Money, Credit and Banking 543 
(2004). Cf. Sandra E. Black & Phillip E. Strahan, Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability, 57 J. 
Fin. 2807 (2002); Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Bank Competition and Firm 
Creation, International Monetary Fund, Working paper WP/01/21 (2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0121.pdf.
71 Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram G. Rajan, The Effect of Credit Markets Competition on 
Lending Relationship, 110  Quart. J.  Econ. 407 (1995).
72 Robert Marquez, Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking 
Industry, 15 Rev. Fin. Stud. 901 (2002). Cf. Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano, Information Sharing in 
Credit Markets: International Evidence, R-371 Inter American Development Bank, Research 
Department,  June (1999) (supporting empirically theoretical predictions that information sharing 
among lending institutions reduces both adverse selection and moral hazard problems and thus improve 
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concentrated banking contributes to the stability of the banking industry and reduces 
the risks of a general banking crisis.73  However, in a recent extensive, global, 
empirical study, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic show that overall bank 
concentration increases financing obstacles and decreases the likelihood of receiving 
bank finance, with this result proving to be particularly strong in countries with less 
developed institutions, a small share of foreign-owned banks and a relatively high 
level of government interference in the banking sector.74  Similar findings have been 
recorded by Cetorelli and Strahan, who conclude that concentration of market power 
by banks presents a significant entry barrier for the entrepreneurial sector of an 
economy.75  Nonetheless, Cetorelli has emphasized the basic trade-off inherent in the 
structure of the banking industry: while more competition is likely to lead to a larger 
quantity of credit on one hand, accumulation of market power should increase a 
bank's incentives to produce information on prospective borrowers and lead to higher 
quality of screening the applicants on the other hand.76
With respect to the primary question whether concentrated banking is overall 
efficient or whether its regressive effects on borrower firms outweigh its economic 
credit availability for borrowers). On the role of banks as information accumulators and efficient 
monitors for all investors, see Diamond, supra n. 65. 
73 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, Bank Concentration and Crises, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3041 (2003), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/26276_wps3041.pdf However, they also find that banking regulation 
which restricts the banking activity solely to the financial sector limits the banks' diversification and 
thus increases to an extent the overall crisis risk. Nonetheless, the authors find that countries that adopt 
policies which encourage competition throughout the economy are less likely to suffer from a systemic 
banking failure. Cf. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Competition and Financial Stability, (March 24th, 
2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/042003/cfs_032403.pdf
(demonstrating that the competition-stability trade-off in the structure of the banking industry is 
applicable in certain situations, but not all).
74 See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, Bank Competition and 
Access to Finance: International Evidence, 36 J. Money, Credit and Banking 627 (2004). Cf. Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government Ownership of Banks, (2000), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236434 (finding a strong banking 
concentration in countries whose banking industry is dominated by governmental ownership).
75 Nicola Cetorelli & Phillip E. Strahan, Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and 
Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets, NBER Working Paper No. W10832 (October 2004), 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10832.pdf; cf. Marriane Bertrand, Antoinette Schoar & David Thesmar, 
Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985, 
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, 4488 (2004), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4488.asp
(finding that distortions in bank lending as a result of the banking structure create artificial barriers to 
entry in the real sectors of the economy).
76 Nicola Cetorelli, Competition among Banks: Good or Bad?, 2Q Econ. Persp., 38 (2001). Cf. 
Nicola Cetorelli and Pietro F. Peretto, Oligopoly Banking and Capital Accumulation, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2000-12 (2000); Nicola Cetorelli and Michele Gambera, Banking 
Market Structure, Financial Dependence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data, 56 
J. of  Fin. 627 (2001).
22
benefits this paper takes no assertive position.77  Rather, it assumes that concentrated 
banking is a widespread phenomenon that typifies the market structure of many 
economies throughout the world.  Nonetheless, the following part will expose certain 
adverse effects caused by concentrated banking within the specific context of 
corporate reorganizations.  Even assuming that for certain economies, specifically 
small ones, the macroeconomic overall account leans in favor of a concentrated 
banking structure of their market, one ought not to avoid the search for legal 
measurements which may reduce the adverse effects of concentrated banking.78  Thus, 
Part IV will propose the adoption of a reorganization regime which ameliorates the 
adverse effects of concentrated banking on corporate reorganizations.
III. Concentrated Banking and Bankruptcy
A. Private Bargaining Reorganizations
The general analysis of private bargaining reorganization regimes in Part I
emphasized that its main flaw is the murkiness of the firm's valuation associated 
therewith.  As shown, this distortion undermines the credibility and reliability of 
private bargaining reorganizations.  However, it has also been suggested that the 
appointment of an external, objective, trustee to control the reorganization 
negotiations is likely to amend the valuation distortion and enhance the integrity of 
private bargaining reorganizations.79
And yet, a closer examination of a valuation process championed by a trustee 
reveals the fallacy of a blind reliance on its outcome.  The reliability of a trustee-
ordered valuation is greatly impaired in concentrated banking markets.  That is, in 
countries where the supply of credit is dominated by few large credit institutions, the 
trustee is less independent (and hence neutral) than theoretically presumed.  
Concentrated debt economies suffer from the lack of sufficient competition over 
corporate financing.  As stated earlier, the financing sources of businesses in 
77 For the general dilemma concerning whether competition or the lack thereof is the superior 
economic arrangement, see Phillip E. Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics 11-14, in 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS – ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMICS
(Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1991) (specifically debating the normative justification 
versus the critique of oligopolies and asserting that the lack of competition alone does not necessarily 
imply the distortion of optimal production).
78 See Michal S. Gal, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 154-
192 (2003) (realizing that for small economies oligopolistic structures might be the economic 
equilibrium of the market, and thus advocating the regulation of the oligopoly rather than calling for its 
dismantling altogether).
79 See Part I.A.2 supra.
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concentrated banking economies is predominantly bank lending.80  The effect of the 
(few) banks' domination is multifold.  First, at the inception of the reorganization 
case, the banks appear in court as holders of the largest and senior claims and propose 
their nominee as trustee.  Secondly, because the corporation is in dire need of fresh 
capital to finance its rescue venture, its management will most likely acquiesce to the 
banks' nominee.  As a result of these two factors, it is common practice for the courts 
to appoint as trustee the banks' and corporation's (common) nominee.  In practice, the 
courts follow the pattern of liquidation cases and appoint lawyers or accountants to 
fill this role.  In small economies the number of experienced practitioners in corporate 
reorganizations is relatively small.  Thus, the trustees are usually repeat players.81
The banks tend to nominate those practitioners who have best served the banks' 
interests in previous cases.82  Thus, it is rather naïve to expect the trustee to exercise a 
neutral and independent valuation, which may at times upset the bank (as an 
interested party), when the trustee's appointment in future cases is at stake.83  For the 
same reason, neither should one rely enthusiastically on the trustee's negotiations with 
the banks concerning the restructuring of the latter's debt as representing the best 
interests of the corporation as a whole.  In short, the process of appointing a trustee in 
reorganization cases does not solve the biased valuation problem.
B. Cash Auctions
At first, the call for implementing an auction regime in corporate bankruptcy 
appeared to rest on strong theoretical grounds.  The economic logic underlying this 
proposal is clear and simple.  However, this proposal assumes the existence of certain 
economic conditions.  Most importantly, it assumes market perfection.84  Under the 
80 See supra nn. 65-68 and accompanying text.
81 For the effect of acting as repeat players in numerous Chapter 11 cases on the law firms 
representing a debtor and those representing its creditors, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. 
Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held 
Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 156 (1990).
82 Cf. Vanessa Finch, Controlling the Insolvency Professionals, 6 Insolvency L.J. 228-239 
(1999).
83 See James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
139, 183-184 (2004) (describing a similar phenomenon pertaining to CROs (chief restructuring 
officers), who are formally appointed by the debtor-in-possession and owe it their loyalty, but 
effectively – as repeat players in the Chapter 11 practice – place first and foremost the interests of the 
secured lenders close to their hearts).
84 Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence 
from Japan, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 501, 530 (Jagdeep S. 
Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996) (“Proposals to use auctions or variants thereof in lieu of 
chapter 11 seem premised on the assumption of a healthy market for troubled large firms (or their 
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condition of a perfect market, any potential bidder in the auction has no limitation in 
raising the necessary financing for making the bid.  In other words, all bidders have 
free access to cash.  Indeed, the so-called auction approach to bankruptcy is more 
accurately a cash auction approach.85  It assumes cash money will be placed on the 
table for purchasing the firm from its creditors and the winning bidder will purchase 
the corporation free of its old debt.  However, as correctly observed by Hart and 
Aghion, when one assumes away financing market perfection, and introduces cash-
constrained bidders as a factor of reality, the efficacy of the bankruptcy cash auction 
is severely eroded.86  Commentators acknowledged that where bidders face cash 
constraints, the good being auctioned may be allocated to the bidder whose financial 
strength is supreme although that bidder may not be the highest-value user.87  For 
example, Shleifer and Vishny point out that the financial distress of a firm may appear 
during an industry wide financial crisis, in which case the most natural bidders for the 
firm, its industry counterparts, are cash constrained as well.  In such circumstances the 
number of bidders is likely to be low, which in turn calls into question the benefits of 
having an auction in the first place.88  Thus, while the cash auction model for 
bankruptcy holds for perfect capital markets, imperfections in the supply of cash 
eradicate the justification for such a regime.89  In addition, AHM argued that cash 
assets). As firms shrink from the megafirms usually considered in auction proposals, the healthy 
market assumption becomes more questionable. In samples consisting of small and mid-sized firms, 
auctions may be of little use”); Skeel, supra n.9, at 226 (the law-and-economics proposals for replacing 
Chapter 11 all depend on the assumption of smoothly functioning markets).
85 See Thomas H. Jackson, Comment on Baird, 'Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11', 36 J. L. & 
Econ. 655 (1993). Cf. Bebchuk, supra note 22 , 781-786. 
86 See Oliver Hart, supra n. 36, at 162; Phillipe Aghion, Bankruptcy and Its Reform, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 145, 148 (Vol. I, Peter Newman ed., 1998). In a 
somewhat counterintuitive paper, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan posit that cash auctions in which 
bidders require financing would prove inefficient even if the financing can be easily obtained through a 
perfectly competitive financial market. The cause for the inefficiency is the adverse selection problem 
in the securities market, which cannot effectively separate the valuation of the object being auctioned 
from the terms of the financing. Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & S. Viswanathan, Financing Auction Bids, 
(2004), full text available for download at http://ssrn.com/abstract=265150.
87 See Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, Standard Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders, 65 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 1, 3 (1998) ("Actual auctions are full of examples where bidders' financial strength is 
more important than their valuations in determining the winning bidder … the good may not be 
allocated to the highest-valuation user, but may instead go to a better-financed bidder with a lower 
valuation").
88 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market 
Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1343 (1992).
89 The market-based reform proposals also seem fit primarily for large and publicly-traded 
corporations, but fail to account for the bankruptcy of closely-held corporations. See David A. Skeel, 
Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 465 (1993); Lynn 
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance and the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669 (1993).
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bidders for financially distressed large firms would effectively take the firm private.  
As a result, the bidder would face a great risk-bearing due to potential future 
fluctuation in the firm's value.  It follows then, that bidders would charge for this risk-
bearing by discounting their cash bids, thus frustrating the goal of ex post
maximization of firm's value.90
Nonetheless, an apparent response to the cash constraint objection to cash 
auctions might be the traditional law-and-economics argument that cash is assumed to 
be available for actors in the market, either from their own resources or by raising 
(debt or equity) capital for financing the desired project.91  In economies where the 
local equity markets are underdeveloped, for a cash auction bankruptcy regime to be 
operable the raising of cash would naturally turn the potential bidders to debt 
financing, and specifically to bank loans.  Thus, an analysis of the position of the 
banks, as the default choice for financing a realistic bid on a financially distressed 
firm, is critical for assessing the efficacy of the cash auction model for corporate 
bankruptcy in such economies.  Focusing on the interaction between potential bidders 
for the distressed firm and financing banks, the following sections expose several 
major obstacles which impede efficient financing of cash bids by banks.  The first 
obstacle is derived from the divergent interests and investment preferences of any 
bidder on one hand and any bank on the other.  The second and third obstacles are a 
result of the distortions caused by a concentrated banking structure.
1. The Divergent Preferences: Financing Conservatism
As noted earlier, in concentrated banking markets the channel of equity 
financing for firms is characteristically underdeveloped.92  Indeed, in concentrated 
banking economies the banks are the major suppliers of credit and the overall 
financing for firms.  It follows then, that the banks are often involved in the 
bankruptcy case not only as a potential financer of bidders, but also as a major 
creditor of the corporate debtor.  In such economies, a bank is invariably a senior 
90 Based on this weakness, AHM criticize Baird's cash auction model "as too extreme". See 
Aghion, Hart & Moore (1992), supra n.59, at 527.
91 Margreth Barret, Merger by Peter F Harts, 37 Hastings L.J. 1197, 1203 (1986) (Book 
Review); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Corporate America, 19
Cardozo L. Rev 1, 40 (1997) But see Richard Schmalensee, Horizontal Merger Policy: Problems and 
Changes, 1 J. Econ. Persp. 41, 47-8 (1987) (noting that it is common sense that if business people 
believe that cash constraint is an entry barrier, then such perceptions are likely to affect entry decisions, 
regardless of what economists think of such barriers).
92 See supra Part  II. A.
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secured creditor.93  The bank's position as a major secured creditor is likely to affect 
its discretion whether to finance a bid for the auctioned firm and for what amount. 
Like every other creditor, the bank is interested in being paid on its prebankruptcy 
claim.  Thus, the bank has a natural self-interest to increase the amount of financing it 
advances to the bidders, so that the financing will pay off the bank's own claim.  In 
other words, in financing a bid on the firm the bank is effectively paying itself 
through a process of retiring its preexisting claim by the creation of a new claim.  The 
result of this effect is that to the extent its claim is undersecured, the bank's position as 
a major secured creditor of the firm drives its financing of a bid on the auctioned firm 
up towards the amount of the bank's prebankruptcy claim.  To illustrate, consider 
Firm, whose debt to Bank is 100 and its debt to other creditors is also 100.  All of 
Firm's assets are collateralized to Bank through a blanket lien.  Firm is in bankruptcy 
and is being auctioned off.  Bidder approaches Bank and asks for cash financing for 
the purpose of purchasing Firm.  Bidder values Firm at 70.  Under Bidder's valuation, 
Bank is undersecured.  In such a scenario, Bank is likely to use its influence and 
persuade Bidder to bid higher.94 By increasing Bidder's bid to, say, 80 Bank is both 
improving its own present payback from Firm,95 and entering a newly negotiated 
credit of 80 into its own financial statements (that is, refinancing the original loan) 
rather than listing the old debt as uncollectible debt.96
When Bank is oversecured, however, the financing environment is liable to 
change for Bidder.  Assume now that Bidder values Firm at 150 and asks Bank to 
finance a bid of such amount for Firm.  As any lender would act, Bank obviously 
weighs the Bidder's prospects of timely paying back the loan.  This requires Bank to 
93 Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 Cornell. L. Rev. 1396 
(1997). Cf. Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 Geo L.J 1 
(1997); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1997)
(concerning the mutual choice of bank lenders and borrowers whether to engage in a secured or 
unsecured credit transaction, in a more balanced and competitive market as the U.S.)
94 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra n. 30. A classic method Bank may utilize to push Bidder further 
and increase its bid is to offer Bidder a discounted interest rate for the financing of the increased bid.
95 Indeed an undersecured bank's self-interest to inflate the financing of a cash bid for the debtor 
firm is empirically supported by Eckbo and Thorburn. They surveyed Swedish firms that were 
auctioned in bankruptcy and found that where a bank has an undersecured claim, the bank tends to 
form a coalition with a bidder under which the bank finances bids that drive the price for the firm's 
assets above their liquidation value. However, this study does not produce conclusive empirical data 
for financing bids in cases where the bank is oversecured by the firm's assets. See Eckbo & Karin S. 
Thorburn, Fire-Sales, supra note 37.
96 See Eric Grouse, Banks, Bonds and Risk: The Mycal Bankruptcy and Its Repercussions for the
Japanese Bond Market, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 571, 572 (2002) (noting the reluctance of Japanese 
banks to sustain losses for bad debts of their borrowing firms and write off those debts).
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consider the Bidder's financial stability and its projected use of the credit supplied 
(that is, its use of Firm), as well as exogenous factors which are likely to affect 
Bidder's liquidity.  Bank computes the risk factor of this particular financing and 
charges Bidder with an interest rate proportionally.  However, as the amount of the 
financing requested increases there comes a point where the increase of the risk of 
default outweighs any increase of the feasible interest rate a borrower is capable of 
handling.  Thus, Bank will not necessarily finance Bidder for any amount requested.  
Bank will not risk its money and finance Bidder for 150 even if Bank itself values 
Firm similarly.  Banks are lenders who take precautionary measures to hedge the risks 
associated with credit.  A favorable position for any bank is being an oversecured 
lender.97  That is, banks prefer providing credit which is collateralized by a pool of 
assets the value of which exceeds the amount of credit provided.  This equity cushion 
serves to reduce future risks of default as a result of a substantial increase of the 
borrower's total liabilities or a devaluation of the borrower's total assets.  Thus, 
returning to the example above, even where Bidder can convince Bank that its 
valuation of Firm is reasonable, Bank will provide Bidder with actual financing which 
is lower than 150 to ensure the maintaining of an equity cushion in Firm's assets.  An 
extraction of the above example can illustrate how this can undermine achieving the 
goal of value maximization.  Assume that Bidder B approaches Bank and asks it to 
finance a bid for Firm for 140 (which is Bidder B's valuation).  Assume further that 
Bank's own valuation is closer to Bidder A (that is, 150), but that Bank prefers leaving 
an equity cushion of 20 in the collateralized assets (that is, Firm's assets).  Thus, Bank 
is willing to finance bids for Firm by releasing a credit of only 130.  In this case, both 
Bidder A and Bidder B stand on par to gain Bank's credit, even though Bidder A is 
the highest-valuing user of Firm.98  It follows then, that once the gap between the 
97 Mann, supra note 93, at 638-658; Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82
Tex. L. Rev. 795, 851-2 (2004); Jens Hausmann, The Value of Public-Notice Filing Under Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 9: A Comparison with the German Legal System of Securities in Personal 
Property, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. 427, 476 (1996); Riz Mokal, Administration and Administrative 
Receivership - An Analysis, 57 Cur. Leg. Stud. 1, 9 (2004).
98 This intellectual exercise may even take a twist that will cause Bank to prefer Bidder B, the 
lower-value user of Firm. Assume that Bidders A's value, 150, is the weighted average of a 50% 
probability that Bidder A's control will lead Firm to a value of 220 and a 50% probability that it will 
lead Firm to a value of 80. Assume further that Bidder B's value, 140, is the weighted average of a 50% 
probability that Bidder A's control will lead Firm to a value of 180 and a 50% probability that it will 
lead Firm to a value of 100. In this scenario, Bank is likely to prefer financing Bidder B, despite its 
inferior use of Firm. Bank is concerned that Bidder A might yield only 80, causing Bank a loss of 20 
on its prebankruptcy loan, while financing Bidder B guarantees Bank full payment on this loan. Cf.
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bidders' valuation and the banks' self-imposed cap on financing is exposed it becomes 
apparent that the goal of maximizing the value of the debtor firm is unattainable 
through cash auctions.   
The financing conservatism phenomenon is a typical financing approach 
which banks adopt.99 The self-imposed cap on the amount a bank is likely to finance 
is applicable in low- and high competitive banking environments.  In underdeveloped 
equity markets, this natural bank conservatism cannot be off-set by the potential of 
bidders obtaining financing elsewhere.  Because equity financing is barely a viable 
option in such economies, bank loans rule the financing market.  The banks' self-
restraint on financing creates a smoke screen through which the signal of the highest-
valuing user of the financially distressed firm cannot be amplified and thus received 
by the selling creditors.  
Moreover, in underdeveloped equity markets, the absolute dependency of 
bidders on bank financing makes the outcome of the auction one which is completely 
dependent on the financing bank's valuation of the auctioned firm, rather than on the 
bidder's valuations.100 As explained in the preceding paragraphs, a lender cannot be 
relied on to serve as the efficient screener of the various bidders.  Because of its cap 
on financing, a lender may not necessarily pick the highest-valuing user.  Thus, 
entrusting the screening of cash auction bids and selecting the winning bid exclusively 
in the hands of the financing bank might fail to obtain this scheme's policy goals.  A 
bank's financing of the auction is liable to curtail efficient value-maximizing 
competition, as this competition is capped by the bank's lender conservatism.
2. Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism
By definition, in a typical concentrated banking market the banking industry in 
general and the leading dominant banks in particular form an oligopoly.101
Economists acknowledge that one cannot identify one single prevailing "theory of 
oligopoly".102  A prediction of oligopoly behavior in a certain industry cannot be 
David A. Skeel Jr.,, The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 25 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1905, 1924 (2004).
99 Cf. Mann, supra n. 93 at 664; Macey & Miller, supra note 67, at 77-80; Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured 
Debt, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 628, 649 (1992).
100 Aghion, Hart & Moore (1992), supra n. 59  , at 539.
101 Joseph A. Schumpeter, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 305 (1954) relates the origins of the 
term oligopoly to Sir Thomas Moore's Utopia, published in 1516.
102 The classic models of oligopoly are the Cournot Model and the Bertnard Model. See Simon 
Bishop & Mike Walker, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW: CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND
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seriously considered reliable unless it is predicated on specific assumptions pertaining 
to that oligopolistic environment.103  In this vein, the troubling question in antitrust 
law has always been when should oligopolies be subjected to legal scrutiny.  Should 
their mere existence subject them to regulative limitations, or need there be some
overt act to substantiate a coordinated anticompetitive practice?  Traditional antitrust 
law has particularly targeted explicit agreements which formed organized cartels, but 
demonstrated a lax approach to covert cooperation among competitors.104
Nonetheless, in an oligopolistic market the potential for harmful anticompetitive 
behavior indeed exists one way or the other.  Moreover, the penalizing of explicit 
cartel agreements by antitrust law makes secretive anticompetitive behavior the 
preferred course of action for potential conspiring oligopolists.105  But even if 
oligopolists act independently of one another, and thus apparently non-cooperatively, 
game theory predicts that given certain conditions the oligopolists will act 
cooperatively in what is known as conscious parallelism or tacit collusion.106  That is, 
each party is acting independently to maximize its own wealth through high-pricing.  
Yet, consciously predicting a similar high-pricing behavior of its rivals and the 
parties' interdependence (given the oligopoly structure), then without explicitly 
receiving or conveying any communication from (or to) them concerning each other's 
behavior, each party continues its high-pricing. As a result, a cooperative, 
anticompetitive, equilibrium emerges.  Acting on a long term basis, with no certainty 
as to the time period in which one of the players will remove itself from a certain 
pattern of behavior, often players participate in an infinite repeated game, or 
supergame.107  Game theory predicts that the infinite repetition of a game leads to 
cooperative behavior among the players.108  However, this general prediction must be 
MEASUREMENT 29-33 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 333-352 (Vol. I, Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
103 Shapiro, id.
104 See Richard A. Posner, ANTITRUST LAW 53-55 (2nd ed. 2001); Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. 
Gertner & Randal C. Picker, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 178 (1994) (explaining that a possible 
justification for a legal rule, which illegalizes explicit anticompetitive agreements, but which stops 
short of condemning tacit collusion, "rests ultimately not on the absence of any ability on the part of 
the firms to engage in tacit collusion, but rather on our inability to do much about it." )
105 Cf. Posner, id at 52.
106 See Andrew Dick, Cartels and Tacit Collusion, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 206 (vol. I, P. Newman ed., 1998) (defining tacit collusion as "coordination 
among firms that occurs without an explicit agreement"). 
107 Eric Rasmusen, GAMES AND INFORMATION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 132 (3d 
ed., 2001); James W. Friedman, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMICS 108 (1990)
108 Robert Axelrod, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) demonstrated that such cooperative 
behavior emerges even between sophisticated players, based on the adoption of a tit-for-tat strategy. 
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qualified, as the high-priced anticompetitive practice of the oligopolists creates 
incentives for the individual firm to cheat the others, cut its prices below the joint 
level and generate larger (short-term) profits as the result of its increased (low-priced) 
sales, despite the future retaliation ramifications the firm will suffer from its 
counterparts.  Thus, tacit collusion equilibria might prove to be fragile and 
unstable.109 A cooperative anticompetitive equilibrium is more likely to emerge and 
remain stable over time given the following limiting conditions to the game:  (a) any 
deviation from cooperation is easily detected and observed by the other parties;110 (b) 
the parties can react swiftly to the deviation (e.g. adjust prices); and (c) the non-
deviating parties can inflict upon the cheater a severe and effective punishment.111
Detection of deviations from a common practice, coordination and infliction of a 
penalty on the cheating party is mostly effective as the number of the players in the 
game is lower.112  As the number of players increases coordination entails greater 
See also Baird et al., supra n. 104, at 173-174. But see Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play, 20 
RAND J. Econ.113 (1989) (presenting a skeptical opinion regarding the contribution of academic 
game-theory to understanding real-life business competition and the restriction thereof. In his closing 
words: "There is a strong tendency for even the best practitioners to concentrate on the analytically 
interesting questions rather than on the ones that really matter for the study of real-life industries. The 
result is often a perfectly fascinating piece of analysis. But so long as the tendency continues, those 
analyses will remain merely games economists play.") 
109 See Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Mergers, in 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, at 420-421 (Vol. I, Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig eds., 1989) ("from the point of view of cartel stability, the more successful firms are at raising 
price, the greater is the incentive to chisel. A cartel therefore contains the seeds of its own undoing.")
110 Stigler notes that one's deviation from the joint collusion may be detected by observing a shift 
of buyers from other sellers to that seller. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly,
72 J. Political Economy 44, 48 (1964). Jacquemin and Slade note that other effective means of 
detection are joint gathering of information by the other parties through a joint trade association, the 
detection of prices which are public knowledge (for example, in the case of an open bid), promising a 
buyer to match any price-cut offered by a rival firm (and thus revealing secret price-cuts), or observing 
a pattern of sales by one firm. Jacquemin & Slade, supra n. 109, at 421-422.
111 Baird et al., id, at 174-175. Cf. Bishop & Walker, supra n.102, at 151 (explaining that a 
punishment threat for cheaters is credible when the punishment mechanism is targeted solely on the 
cheating firm. That is, as a response to a cheater, the other players will not react across-the-board by 
cheating similarly, but rather invade only the cheater's "territory" for a given time period. "That will 
allow the other firms to punish the cheater whilst not sacrificing the cartel profits they earn in their own 
exclusive territories.") Shapiro notes that disciplining the cheater by the other parties might sometimes 
create a strange outcome: in order to preserve the collusive practice, the non-cheating parties will
(temporarily) increase competition (for example, by flooding the market with supply and lowering all 
prices). Shapiro, supra n.102, at p. 357; Cf. Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative 
Collusion under Imperfect Price Information, 52 Econometrica 87 (1984) (listing similar features as 
characteristic for tacit collusion and arguing, like Shapiro, that market price drops by the joint colluders 
does not signal the collapse of the collusion but rather is part of its enforcement)).
112 Baird et al., supra n. 104 at p. 175. Hay and Kelley examined price-fixing cases handled by 
the U.S. Department of Justice and found that most cases involve ten or fewer firms. G.A. Hay & D. 
Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. & Econ. 13 (1974) When the 
number of players is low enough yet exceeds two, the pooling of information by the non-deviating joint 
colluders makes the detection of the deviation easier and thus even a relatively moderate price-cutting 
will not pass unnoticed under the other players' radar. Stigler, supra n.110, at 51.
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costs and the personal stake of each party in the harm caused by the cheater is smaller.  
It follows then, that assuming the existence of the aforementioned qualifying 
conditions, oligopolistic industries with a low number of dominant players are 
susceptible to anticompetitive cooperative behavior.113
As noted in Part II, this article takes concentrated banking as a given, and 
appreciates that there may be significant virtues in such a structure of the banking 
industry for certain economies.  Nonetheless, in certain respects, the oligopolistic 
structure of concentrated banking can tag the banks with the label of suspects of tacit 
collusion.  To the extent that tacit collusion by the banks can be deduced from their 
subtle interests and supported by pointing to the existence of game theory's 
cooperative facilitating conditions, a legal response is justified albeit not one which 
calls for restructuring the banking industry lest we throw out the baby with the bath 
water.  The following paragraphs will demonstrate that tacit collusion may indeed be 
a troubling concern in concentrated banking and highlight the negative effects that 
bank financing of cash bids for the acquisition of a financially distressed firm might 
carry as a result thereof.  Namely, these negative effects are (a) the direct costs of the 
banks' credit and (b) the hazard of a systematic squeezing-out of junior creditors.
a. High-Priced Interest Rates 
 Purchasing a firm free of its old debt is no cheap transaction.  Usually, the 
value of paying off the firm's debt is quite significant.  For most potential purchasers, 
requiring a cash payment for the debtor firm necessarily involves raising cash 
themselves as a prerequisite for placing a bid.114  In concentrated banking economies 
this means effectively that a potential bidder must first find a financing bank as its 
cash source. The banking industry in a concentrated banking economy is effectively 
comprised of two to three major banks.115 Even where there are more banks in the 
industry, these markets often experience a major dominance  of a few leading banks 
113 See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1562, 1565 (1969). But see Stigler, supra n.110, at  49 (theorizing that concentration alone is not 
sufficient for establishing tacit collusion, unless additional factors increase the probability of its 
existence. One such important factor is the relative ease or the lack thereof of the buyers to shift among 
sellers, notwithstanding the concentrated position of the latter).
114 Cf. Phillipe Aghion, Bankrupty and Its Reform, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 145, supra n.86, at 146 (vol I, Peter Newman ed., 1998) (noting that one of 
the two major problems with receivership is that it typically involves a cash sale of the firm, and raising 
the cash may prove difficult a task in the case of a large corporation).
115 See the data referenced to in n.116 infra.
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which enjoy a strong hold over the financing market.116  Given this strong dominance
and the low number of banks active in such markets, the degree of inter-bank 
competition in concentrated banking economies is relatively low.  It follows then that 
the financing banks are in a classic oligopolistic position.  As a result, the financing 
that potential bidders are seeking is liable to come at a high cost.117  As oligopolists, 
the banks may charge prohibitively high interest rates on their loans.118  Since no 
other feasible financing sources exist in these markets, potential bidders may face a 
major financing barrier impeding their intent to bid on the firm.  This obstacle 
decreases the likelihood that the firm will be sold eventually to its most efficient user.  
As studies have shown, it is more likely that the winning bidder will be the one with 
better access to bank financing rather than the highest valuing person.119  In short, 
while the underlying idea of an auction approach is to use the market by increasing 
competition over the firm's value and ensuring its placing in the hands of the highest-
valuing user, the financing barrier of concentrated banking undermines the very 
competition that a (cash) auction regime is supposed to facilitate.  
b. Squeezing Out Junior Creditors
Adoption of a cash auction regime in concentrated banking economies is 
likely to lead to another negative repercussion.  As noted earlier, in such economies 
the financing bank is invariably also the senior secured creditor of the debtor firm.  
However, there exist other creditors as well.  Creditors of a common debtor have 
116 The World Bank measures the degree of bank concentration based on the assets of the three 
largest banks in a country as a share of assets of all commercial banks. For the year 2001, of 145 
countries surveyed, the average concentration ratio was 0.6115, with the median figure being 0.5969. 
See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, supra n. 63, spreadsheet, Column P, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/structure_database.xls  Measuring bank 
concentration by this ratio is reflected also in academic literature. Ongena and Smith find that the 
overall average number of banks with which a European firm holds relationship is 6, although there 
exists a great variance among firms from the specific European countries. S. Ongena & D.C. Smith, 
What Determines the Number of Bank Relationship: Cross Country Evidence, 9 J. of Fin. 
Intermediation 26 (2000). Dewatripont and Maskin hypothesize that in countries with strong banking 
concentration, firms will hold on average relationships with fewer banks. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 
Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, 62 Rev.  Econ. Stud. 541 (1995)
117 See John H. Boyd and Gianni De Nicolo, Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited, 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 03/114 (2003) (stressing that banks with greater 
market power tend to charge higher interest rates on their loans).
118 Cf., in the U.K., Competition Commission, A Report on The Supply of Banking Services by 
Clearing Banks to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry and the Chancellor of the Exchequer) (March 2002), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/641/E9/competition_com_bank.pdf. 
119 See supra n.87 and accompanying text.
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heterogeneous interests.120  The divergent priorities of the creditors' claims affect the 
creditors' decision-making.  While senior creditors are more apt to promote financial 
solutions for the debtor which carry a low net present value, junior creditors 
constantly seek solutions which maximize the debtor's value beyond the bounded 
horizons of the senior creditor's secured claim.  The following paragraph 
demonstrates that in concentrated banking markets, the banks' domination of the 
supply side of financing creates a potential hazard of the formation of a bank-bidder 
coalition to squeeze-out the debtor's junior creditors through a cash auction.  To 
clarify this argument, it will be first assumed that a cash auction takes place in a 
market with a single monopolist bank.  After identifying the interests leading up to the 
squeeze-out coalition, the monopoly assumption shall be substituted by the more 
realistic banking structure, that of an oligopoly comprised of few dominant banks.  
The squeeze-out hazard shall then be analyzed against this state of the banking 
industry.
Monopolistic Banking
Consider once again Firm, whose secured debt to Bank is 100 and whose debt 
to Unsecured Creditors is also 100.  Now assume Bidder approaches Bank for 
financing a bid on Firm's assets.  Bidder values Firm at 150 and thus asks for 
financing such a bid.  Assume further that Bank, like bidder, values Firm in the hands 
of Bidder at 150.  The Bank contemplates the financing it is willing to advance to 
Bidder accordingly.  It has been shown earlier that in any market, concentrated- and 
dispersed banking alike, Bank is likely to cap its financing at a figure lower than 150, 
say 130.121  However, given now Bank's monopolistic position, it enjoys complete and 
exclusive control over the auction.122  Because Bank is the bottleneck through which 
120 Baird, supra note 21, at 79-91; Douglas G. Baird, Thomas H Jackson, Barry E. Adler, 
BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 1-3 (3d. ed. 2000) 
121 See supra Part III.B.1.
122 Cf. Stephen J. Lubben, The New and Improved Chapter 11, Seton Hall Law School Public 
Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2 (July 21, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=567321 (discussing the control of a dominant DIP lender 
over a reorganization case in the U.S. and its distortion of the overall reorganization process, in that it 
impedes the interests of other creditors).  Cf. Skeel, supra n. 98, at 1921-1926 (noting that the control 
that DIP lenders gain over the governance of a debtor undergoing Chapter 11 carries the risks of 
excessive risk-aversion by the controlling lender and undermining value maximization goals through 
takeout fees charged by the lender. However, plans for post-reorganization business relationships 
between the debtor and that DIP lender ameliorate the excessive risk-taking peril, and thus also explain 
the waivers of the takeout fees upon continuation of business between these two parties).
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all bids must pass due to all bidders' lack of alternative financing,123 once Bank has 
agreed to finance Bidder at a price determined by Bank itself any potential competitor 
will find the financing barrier as impenetrable.  Bank's effective control of the cash 
auction makes it the sole entity to effectively determine the winning bid.124  Bank 
considers its options.  For Bank and Bidder, two options are possible: 
Option I – Bank advances at present financing of 130 for Bidder's bid;
Option II – Bank advances at present financing of 100 for Bidder's bid (i.e.
Stage 1) and reserves the remaining value of 30 for future advances (i.e. for Stage 2).
Option I reflects Bank's own (discounted) valuation of the financially 
distressed debtor under the control of Bidder.  Admittedly, Bank plans to generate 
income on this financing, reflected by the interest rate it charges.  If this interest rate 
is denoted R, then the income the Bank expects to generate is R*130.  However, 
advancing the entire 130 to Bidder at this stage renders the entire corporate enterprise 
of Firm as fully collateralized.  In other words, at the very stage of the bid, Firm's 
financing capacity is fully exhausted.  The financing of Bidder under Option I stifles 
future financing channels for Firm at a time when it is in dire need of additional 
funding – upon its emergence from financial distress and return to full scale business 
activity.125  Although both Bidder and Bank value Bidder's use of Firm at 150, the 
tools available for this use are severely restricted by the early exhaustion of the latter's 
credit capacity.  This limitation goes against the mutual interests of Bidder and Bank.  
Bidder's valuation of Firm cannot be realized without exogenous cash infusions 
following its acquisition of the control of Firm.  The realistic payback to Bank of its 
financing of Bidder's bid (that is, 130*(1+R)) is predicated primarily on the firm's 
profits, profits which cannot be gained absent (additional) external financing beyond 
Bidder's purchase price.
Bank may enhance its own position, though, coincidentally with that of 
Bidder, by opting for Option II.  Under Option II, Bank will advance only 100 for the 
123 See supra Part  III.B.
124 In a similar vein, while analyzing the functions of secured credit, commentators argued that 
the focus of secured lending is in the control and strategic power it gives the lender over the borrower 
firm's property rather than the potential foreclosure on the collateral. See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and 
Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 159 (1997); Westbrook, supra n. 97. 
125 Upon emergence from bankruptcy, the firm needs cash to pay its employees, new suppliers 
and similar current expenses, until it can generate sufficient cash-flow from its own business 
operations.  Skeel, supra note 35, at 923; Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions 
and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 287, 313 (2001); Gregory L. Germain,
Avoiding Phantom Income in Bankruptcy: A Proposal for Reform, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 249, 251-3 (2001).
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bid.126  This limitation of the bid serves well both Bidder and Bank.  Bidder acquires 
the control of Firm at a discounted price (compared to its own private valuation) and 
enjoys an equity cushion of 50 in Firm for future financing.  Likewise, Bank enhances 
its own payback on its original loan to Firm,127 while simultaneously leaving itself 
(the monopolist) an equity cushion to serve as collateral for the (near future) jump-
start financing Firm will most likely require for its emerging from bankruptcy.  Stage 
2 of the Bank-Bidder overall financing follows shortly after the acquisition of the 
control of Firm by Bidder was completed successfully.  At this stage, Bank will 
advance the additional 30 it was willing to advance all along.  By bifurcating the 
overall financing and reserving the 30 to Stage 2, Bank and Bidder join forces in 
diverting the use of the ultra-Bank-claim value from payout to Unsecured Creditors to 
financing the post-payout emergence of Firm from bankruptcy.  Put differently: The 
two stage financing allows the jump-start financing to take place from the 101st dollar, 
rather than the 131st.  While this facilitates Bidder's realization of its value from the 
use of Firm and improves Bank's probability to collect eventually 130*(1+R), this 
bifurcation comes at the expense of Unsecured Creditors, who are squeezed out in the 
middle.128  With respect to the ultra-Bank-claim value of 30, Unsecured Creditors are 
the true economic sellers.  Nonetheless, given the structuring of the financing by the 
monopolistic Bank they might be deprived of this value in the classic cash auction 
model.129
126 Indeed an empirical study of bank lending in the U.K. to financially distressed firms found 
that the dominant lending banks do not increase their lending nor do they roll-over the loan, but rather 
tend to contract their financing during the rescue period. See Julian Franks & Oren Sussman, Financial 
Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
3915 (2002), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/conferences/conf0209/franks.pdf .
127 In essence, the cash financing of the bid at 100 is a refinancing of Bank's original loan, with 
the potential legal effect of a shift of the obligor.  To the extent Bidder undertakes to repay the bid 
financing personally, Bank's obligor has changed from the debtor-firm to Bidder. However, if the bid 
financing was advanced as a secured non-recourse loan, then the refinancing remains within the 
boundaries of the original obligor (the debtor-firm). Nonetheless, even in the latter case, the underlying 
assumption of the refinancing is that under the new control of Bidder, the repayment to Bank is 
facilitated. 
128 A competition between potential bidders may arise, though. However, given Bank's interest in 
limiting the principal of the auction-financing loan, Bank is likely to channel the competition between 
bidders to the interest rate they are willing to pay over a loan of 100. By limiting the principal of the 
loan to 100 and developing a competition among bidders over the interest rate, Bank both successfully 
bifurcates its financing between the two stages and increases its expected return on the loan through the 
increased, competitive, interest rate. From the perspective of Unsecured Creditors, however, a 
competition between bidders over the interest rate payable to Bank is of no avail.  As long as Bank is 
successful in limiting the principal of the loan to its original claim, the cash bid deprives Unsecured 
Creditors of their economic stake in Firm.
129 Cf. Laurent Vilanova, Bank Seniority and Corporate Debt Restructuring, (March 12, 2004). 
EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 2880, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=554602 (noting 
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Oligopolistic Banking
Setting aside the assumption of a single monopolistic bank, a more realistic 
analysis must consider the dynamics of the financing of a cash auction in an 
oligopolistic banking environment.  Is the existence of several banks likely to develop 
an effective competition for financing a cash bid for the control of a financially 
distressed firm?  This paragraph will demonstrate that an affirmative answer to this 
question is overly-optimistic.  In concentrated banking economies, the potential 
detrimental effect of tacit collusion is substantial particularly in the context of 
squeeze-out.  In the financing market, the oligopolist banks are repeat players in an 
indefinite supergame.  This is likely to lead the banks to cooperative behavior rather 
than rigorous competition.130  As a result, the banks might limit the competition over 
the financing of bids for financially distressed corporations and set the bidding prices 
for cash auction at the value of the secured lender's (the bank) prebankruptcy claim.  
That is, given a bank's self interest in limiting the amount of finance in Stage I (the 
auction) and reserving the remainder for Stage II (post-auction financing), all the 
oligopolist banks are liable to limit their financing of the auction bids similarly.  
Indeed, in the short-run, financing a higher bid will allow the deviating bank to sway 
business from its rivals, but in the long-run this cheating will not pass unpunished.  
Based on a classic tit-for-tat strategy, the cheating bank will suffer corrective 
retaliation from its rivals who will cheat upon the cheater in future auctions.  This 
facilitates long term anticompetitive cooperation among the rival banks.131  This 
anticompetitive behavior comes at the expense of junior creditors, who are squeezed 
out through the cash auction, as explained above.132
It has been shown earlier, that the probability of tacit collusion among 
oligopolists is highest when deviation from the collusive behavior is easily and 
quickly detected and the number of participant firms is relatively low.133  The early 
detection accelerates the infliction of punishing measures against the deviator.  The 
that risk shifting from senior bank lenders to junior creditors occurs even if both types of creditors are 
equally informed); Franks & Sussman, supra n.126 (finding some evidence of opportunistic behavior 
by senior bank lenders at the expense of trade creditors).
130 See supra Part III.B.2.
131 Cf. Jacquemin & Slade, supra n.109, at 453 (discussing collusive bidding); Dick, supra n.106, 
at  207 (same).
132 See supra Part III.B.2.b.
133 Ibid.
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low number of participants facilitates the effective coordination of the penalty.  
Jacquemin and Slade noted that a readily available detection measure is the 
observance of prices offered by rivals in an open bid.134  Where a cash auction is 
conducted for a bankrupt firm, which is financed by one of the banks, any bid which 
exceeds the value of the secured lender's (i.e. the bank) prebankruptcy claim 
immediately reveals for the rival banks a deviation by that bidder's financing bid.135
As for the low number of participants, this is precisely the case in concentrated 
banking economies.136
This tacit collusion hazard is Stiglerianly exacerbated when one acknowledges 
the limited mobility of bidders from one bank to another in concentrated banking.137
The literature discussing concentrated banking shows that in such economies 
customers develop relationship banking activity rather than transaction-based 
activity.138  That is, a customer banks primarily with one bank for many years and 
seldom shifts to another bank.139 Furthermore, based on data extracted from a survey 
of Norwegian firms, Ongena et al. showed that during periods of crisis the 
concentration of bank relationship increases, and the use of international banking is 
cut by fifty percent (50%).140 This limited mobility fortifies the collusive horizons for 
the banks.  They need not fear defection of long time customers, as the latter are not 
likely to seek financing for a bid on the distressed firm elsewhere.
Oligopolist banks are thus suspect of a cooperative behavior which facilitates 
refinancing of their own secured lending through cash auctions while systematically 
depriving junior unsecured creditors of surplus value they are entitled to under the 
absolute priority rule.  This suspicion severely thwarts the efficacy of cash auctions, 
as their ultimate goal of value maximization for the creditors is frustrated.
C. The Homogeneous Options Models
134 Jacquemin & Slade, supra n.109.
135 Cf. Marc S. Robinson, Collusion and the Choice of Auction, 16 RAND J. Econ. 141 (1985) 
(arguing that collusive bidding is more likely in open auctions than sealed-bids auctions.)
136 See supra Part II.A.
137 See Stigler, supra n.110 , at 48-9.
138 See Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, Competition and Strategic Focus in Lending 
Relationships,  (October 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=257649
139 http://econ.worldbank.org/files/16574_Berger_Klapper_Udell_JBF_2001.pdf (Section 2); 
http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/papers/Awaboot/english/Relationship_banking_know_JFI.pdf.
140 Ongena , supra n. 116
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It has been shown earlier that leading scholars introduced innovative models 
which overcome the heterogeneity problem and purport to channel the resolution of 
bankruptcy towards a homogeneous decision making regime.141  However, the 
common flaw in their models has always been their limited compatibility.  To buy out 
the senior classes under either the Bebchuk Proposal or the AHM Proposal, the 
holders of the options need the coveted cash. That is, the implementation of either 
model requires cash, and a significant amount thereof.  But, as shown with respect to 
the cash auction model of bankruptcy, cash is precisely the resource lacking in 
concentrated banking markets.  Thus, these models fall short as far as the latter 
markets are concerned.142 However, an interesting model which strives to follow the 
contours of these Proposals while apparently ameliorating the cash constraint hurdle 
was proposed by Hart, La Porta Drago, Lopez-de-Silanes and Moore.143  The HLLM 
Proposal, as openly declared by its authors, is an improved AHM Proposal.  The 
AHM Proposal calls for a vote of the newly converted equityholders on the bids 
received for the firm through a market auction.  In addition, the HLLM Proposal adds 
an earlier auction, in which the firm's (old) claimants would be entitled to exercise 
their reorganization-issued options by selling them to outside purchasers.  While 
HLLM are sensitive to the cash constraint problem and its undermining of the 
homogeneity driven models of bankruptcy, their own model is also likely to fail in 
concentrated banking markets.  The sale of the newly issued options in itself is subject 
to a requirement that the outsiders pay cash for the rights purchased.  If the outside 
acquirer of these options plans to purchase the entire class of options or the majority 
thereof, the acquirer will need once again a significant amount of cash.  This would 
reintroduce the cash-constraint barrier, only from the perspective of the outside 
purchaser rather than from the standpoint of the original option holders.  
Alternatively, the newly issued options may be acquired on the market by many 
141 See Part I.B.2 supra.
142 See Alexander Dilger, The Market is Fairer than Bebchuk's Scheme, http://www.rsf.uni-
greifswald.de/bwl/pdf/2000/09_2000.pdf (2000) (criticizing Bebchuk's options proposal for corporate 
reorganization inter alia because it is unfit for cash constrained junior creditors who cannot exercise 
the options distributed to them AHM (1992) note and acknowledge that their own proposal entails the 
use of either cash or non-cash instruments by the outside bidders on the firm, thus ameliorating the 
bidders' financing problem.. See Aghion, Hart & Moore, supra n.59, at 539-540. Nonetheless, their 
proposal suffers, like the Bebchuk Proposal, from the weakness that the option holders need cash to 
first exercise their buy-out options.
143 Oliver Hart, Rafael La Porta Drago, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & John Moore, A New 
Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions, NBER Working Paper 6278 (Nov. 1997), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6278 (hereinafter: the HLLM Proposal).
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purchasers as small fractions of the overall rights in the firm, with each purchaser 
investing a minimal amount of cash.144  However, this assumes the existence of a well 
developed securities market.  It has been shown earlier that in concentrated banking 
economies such a market is less developed.145  The trading volume in such markets is 
relatively small.  In addition, even assuming there exists a well functioning market, 
acquisitions of fractions of the newly issued options may be applicable only for 
publicly traded firms but not for the closely-held ones.146  The latter type of firm is 
found in abundance in concentrated banking markets.  In short, these are the flaws 
which would prove the inapplicability of the HLLM Proposal in concentrated banking 
markets.147
IV. The Proposed Regime: Non-Cash Auctions
A. The Proposal
The former part established the reason why adopting a cash auction bankruptcy 
regime in concentrated banking markets would prove erroneous.  Having rejected the 
basic model of auctions, the question which now looms is what ought to be the 
appropriate bankruptcy regime for such markets in their stead.  One possible model is 
to readopt the private bargaining regime, under which a reorganization plan is 
structured through direct negotiations between the debtor and its prebankruptcy 
creditors.  However, it has been shown earlier, that while this model has two variants, 
either conducting negotiations by the debtor-in-possession (DIP) or by a court 
appointed trustee, both suffer from significant shortcomings.148  DIP controlled 
negotiations have been widely criticized as a process overly biased in favor of 
management and the equityholders.149  On the other side of the bias token, trustee 
controlled negotiations are a dubious fit for small economies with concentrated 
144 Correlatively, any individual original option holder may opt to exercise the buy-out option 
with respect to its small fraction of the class of options, by buying-out a pro rata  portion of the senior 
claimholders' stake in the firm's (new) equity. See Hart, supra n. 36, at 180-181. Indeed, under the 
HLLM Proposal, the buy-out option may be exercised first internally, by (old) junior claimants, and 
only afterwards will the cash-out of the newly issued equity rights in the firm be open to external 
bidding.
145 See supra Part III.B.
146 See n.89 supra.
147 Hart struggles to argue that the AHM Proposal is applicable also for small corporations, where 
the junior trade creditors would be entitled to buy-out the senior secured bank creditors. Hart, supra n.
36, at 183. However, Hart stops short of convincingly explaining from where exactly would the trade 
creditors generate the necessary cash for exercising this buy out option.
148 See supra Part III.A..
149 Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 17; Roe, supra note 31, 533; D. Hahn, supra n. 35
(limiting the critique of DIP controlled regimes particularly to equity ownership concentrated markets).
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banking due to the trustee's strong and longtime economic ties with the dominating 
creditors.150  Thus, bankruptcy cases of firms in concentrated banking markets merit a 
different mechanism for resolving those firms' financial distress and paying off their 
creditors.
In my opinion, any resolution must first conform to the legal and cultural tradition 
of the country in question.151  It must be a receptive model, easily implemented by the 
legal practice.152  As Mark Roe correctly noted, in a free capitalistic society certain 
inefficient legal structures may endure more than efficient alternatives to the extent 
that they are more feasible politically.153  Attempting to employ a model which is 
simplistic and traditionalist enough on one hand, yet responsive to the character of 
concentrated banking economies on the other hand, I propose that such markets hold
an open non-cash auction of the debtor firm. Like cash auctions, non-cash auctions 
are public and open to any prospective bidder.  However, the consideration a bidder 
must offer in a non-cash auction differs significantly from that required under a cash 
auction procedure.  In non-cash auctions, a bidder may offer to pay off the firm's 
prebankruptcy claims through an economic package containing any combination of 
payment instruments.  The payment may include some cash, but also the issuance of 
new debt instruments to the old creditors, payable in installments.  Alternatively, the 
bidder may offer new equity shares in the debtor firm in exchange for the creditors' 
prebankruptcy claims.154  Be the consideration paid in a non-cash auction as it may, a 
common denominator is shared by all non-cash bidders: to some extent, they all rely 
150 See III.A supra.
151 Sensitive to economic and political traditions, Manfred Balz, an experienced German 
bankruptcy scholar, proposed that countries from Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America 
adopt an auction mechanism for financially distressed corporations, which would offer to hold either an 
asset type auction or an equity type auction. These countries have little experience with market 
mechanisms, low standards of accounting, and inadequately educated and poorly paid judges. In his 
opinion, such countries are less suited to adopt a complex bargaining-based reorganization regime. 
Manfred Balz, Equity Auctions and a New Concept of Priority: Two Bankruptcy Reform Proposals,
(March 1, 2001) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=264511.
152 Cf. Easterbrook, supra n.46 .
153 Roe, Backlash, supra n. 8 at 236-237. Applying this general observation to the specific context 
of corporate reorganizations, inter alia, he thus states as follows: "it is hard to see how secondary 
political effects can be eliminated from the efficiency inquiry. One can believe in the stand-alone 
efficiency of this or that institution (free-wheeling hostile takeovers, chapter 11 sales of public 
companies) and still doubt whether their persistence will maximize political efficiency. The dampening 
rules may enhance a system's adaptivity and stability, preserving the core efficiency tendencies of 
capitalism, private property, and competitive markets, by conceding a few economically unwise but 
politically astute regulations here and there." Id, at 237.
154 See Hart, supra n. 36 at 171. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan find that in non-cash auctions 
the use of debt instruments signals to the sellers more informatively the quality of a bidder as compared 
to equity instruments. See Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & S. Viswanathan, Corporate Reorganizations and 
Non-Cash Auctions, 40 J. Fin. 1807 (2000).
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on the future performance of the acquired debtor firm as a means for paying off 
prebankruptcy claims.  In the case of installment payments, the bidder plans to pay 
the claimants out of the firm's future revenues.  Equity instruments issued in an 
equity-for-debt exchange also derive their value from the firm's future performance.  
Effectively, a non-cash auction bankruptcy regime would operate as an improved 
and perfected La Salle approach to corporate bankruptcy.  Under the U.S. Supreme 
Court holding in La Salle,155 whenever a debtor-in-possession proposes a 
reorganization plan which distributes value to the equityholders without first fully 
paying the creditors and that plan fails to receive the approving vote of all the classes 
of creditors, Chapter 11's exclusivity period156 is terminated and the proposed plan is 
exposed to the introduction of competing plans.  Essentially, La Salle mandates 
choosing among competing plans only if the initial plan proposed allocates value to 
the old equityholders.  The non-cash auction bankruptcy regime, on the other hand,
would facilitate the introduction of such competing plans ab initio, in every corporate 
bankruptcy case.  Non-cash auctions reject the initial advantage which management 
and equityholders hold under Chapter 11.  No party enjoys an exclusivity period 
regarding the reorganization plan.  The resolution stage is open for all actors in the 
market, old claimants and equityholders as well as newcomers, each enjoying an 
equal footing in the firm's bankruptcy case.
B. Maximizing Firm's Value
The different consideration used in cash and non-cash auctions is the key to 
evaluating the aptness of either to specific economic markets.  In the case of 
concentrated banking markets, the major obstacle associated with cash auctions 
identified earlier was the powerful position oligopolistic banks hold as the sole 
realistic financiers of a bid for the firm.  This position adversely affects the auction in 
that it frustrates potentially wealth maximizing bids.157  By contrast, non-cash bids 
carry the potential of facilitating such bids.  The lure of non-cash bids in the context 
of concentrated banking markets is that bids can be placed on the debtor firm 
independently, without the bidder having to obtain bank financing as a prerequisite.  
The disengagement of bidders from the dominating banks would significantly 
155 La Salle, supra note 18.
156 Under § 1121(b) of the Bankruptcy Code the debtor enjoys a 120-day exclusivity period 
during which it is the only entity entitled to file a reorganization plan with the court.
157 See Part III.B.1 supra.
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improve the mechanism of a public auction of the firm.  Compared to cash auctions, 
in non-cash auctions more bidders can practicably bid on the firm.  Thus, a true 
competition over the debtor firm, the core of auction theory, would be perfected.158
With more bids being placed on the firm, a reliable market-based valuation may be
extracted from the auction procedure.  Indeed, each bid would likely reflect the 
bidder's valuation of the debtor firm, not the bank's.159  In short, to the extent it is a 
market based valuation of the firm one seeks in bankruptcy, in concentrated banking 
markets that valuation is more likely to be generated through a non-cash auction 
procedure rather than through a cash auction.  
Correlatively, releasing bidders from the financing cords of the dominating banks 
allows new entities to place bids which maximize value to the debtor firm's creditors.  
Compared to the private bargaining model of bankruptcy, non-cash auctions promote 
exogenous resolutions of a firm's financial distress rather than limiting the solutions to 
the firm's prebankruptcy actors.160 Consistent with auction theory, widening the circle 
of potential participants facilitates reaching the goal of maximizing the firm's value.161
C. Modifying Creditors' Legal Rights
Holding a non-cash auction allows the parties to enjoy a market valuation of the 
corporation.  However, unlike cash auctions, in non-cash auctions the determination
of that market valuation is itself subject to further analysis.  Indeed, one of the more 
appealing features of a cash auction regime is the certainty and finality of the 
distribution to the creditors.  In a cash auction, the firm's assets are realized and the 
actual cash proceeds are distributed to the creditors based on their respective priority.  
No speculations and estimations need to be made concerning the firm's value and no 
underlying assumptions remain relevant any longer.  A cash auction renders any 
negotiations between the auctioneer and the firm's creditors obsolete.  The distribution 
158 See Part III.B supra.
159 See AHM, supra n.59 , at 856-7. 
160 But see Elazar Berkovitch, Ronen Israel & Jaime F. Zender, The Design of Bankruptcy Law: A 
Case for Management Bias in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 33 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 441 
(1998) (defending limited auctions bankruptcy regimes, in which only a firm's prebankruptcy creditors 
and management would be eligible to place bids for the control of the firm, and further encouraging a 
favorable treatment of management in bankruptcy as a means for obtaining improved prebankruptcy 
managerial services in the firm).
161 In this vein, Bruce Markell supported allowing prebankruptcy equityholders to participate in 
the bid. Moreover, Markell reasoned that the equityholders possess superior information concerning the 
debtor firm and thus their participation in the bidding releases that information (through the price) to 
other bidders as well. See Markell, supra note 27.
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to the creditors shall be determined exclusively by the amount of the highest cash bid.  
In essence, a cash auction regime shares proximate attributes with a straight-forward 
liquidation procedure.162
Conversely, in a non-cash auction no specified cash is placed on the table for 
distribution to the firm's prebankruptcy creditors upon the announcement of the 
winning bid.  Rather, the payment is based on the firm's future performance.  This 
entails that differentiating one bid from another cannot be based simply on a bidder's 
self assigned dollar value of its bid.  Several parameters affect the true economic 
value of a bid.  The total period of time during which the installment payments are 
due as well as the interest rate they bear, the nature of the future business of the firm 
once a bid is accepted, and the security and guarantees the bidder is proposing to back 
the deferred payments may all vary from one bidder to another.  These variables need 
to be considered in connection with valuing a non-cash bid.  In addition, the 
managerial skills of each bidder play a major role in weighing their respective bids.163
In other words, from the creditors' perspective the actual satisfaction of their legal 
claims is postponed further into the future.  In a manner which in this respect (and this 
respect only) is somewhat reminiscent of privately-bargained reorganizations, the 
creditors remain as claimants or equityholders of the corporation beyond the 
immediate horizon of the reorganization case.  The creditors' claims are yet to be 
satisfied.  Unlike a cash auction, which involves the actual realization of the firm's 
assets, the ensuing distribution of the proceeds to the creditors and the termination of 
all debtor-creditors legal relationships, a non-cash auction requires the creditors to 
exchange one set of legal rights relating to the firm (the prebankruptcy claims) with 
another. In the legal sense, non-cash bids potentially modify the creditors' claims in 
several ways.  First, one must ascertain whether the present value of a bid is equal to 
the creditors' prebankruptcy total amount of claims or smaller.  Secondly, even if the 
present value of a bid is equal to the value of the prebankruptcy claims, modifying the 
payment period in itself, although compensated through the interest promised to be 
paid thereupon, alters the original legal rights of those creditors.  Finally, issuing
equity interests in lieu of the creditors' claims alters completely the nature of the 
162 Baird, Uneasy Case, supra n.3, at 638-641; Jackson, supra  n. 85, at 665-667
163 See Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, supra n.154 , at 1809.
44
creditors' rights in that it turns them from creditors to shareholders.164 From the legal 
perspective, the modification of creditors' rights in non-cash auctions requires holding 
a vote on the bids.  It follows then, that non-cash auctions should be completed 
through a vote taking place once all the bids have been placed.  Indeed, the economic 
preference of the relevant stakeholders must be voiced through their voting for the 
superior bid as they deem it.  Thus, a non-cash auction bankruptcy regime should 
follow the procedural steps of existing private-negotiations bankruptcy regimes.  
Although they differ in economic substance, that is non-cash auctions facilitate
market based bids for the firm while privately negotiated reorganization plans 
facilitate solely the concrete proponent's bid, both regimes ought to share the same 
legal procedure for officially approving the chosen reorganization plan.
In a non-cash auction, voting by creditors on the various bids entails a collective 
decision-making which involves divergent creditors with heterogeneous interests.  It 
has been noted earlier that the heterogeneity problem casts a shadow over the integrity 
and efficacy of the private-bargaining bankruptcy prototype.165  Unlike private-
bargaining, non-cash auctions enjoy a competitive atmosphere and an openness of the 
procedure to any interested participant.  Thus, gaining bargaining leverage and 
distorting the terms of the reorganization plan, the cons of private-bargaining, would 
not impede the integrity of non-cash auctions.  Nonetheless, collective voting on the 
competing bids by classes of creditors cannot avoid the heterogeneity phenomenon.  
Indeed, the involvement of divergent interests of creditors and equityholders in the 
bankruptcy proceeding is an inherent derivative of the law which confers priority on
some creditors while denies such benefits to the others.166  As long as the priority 
system is justified and rests on sound legal policy, the heterogeneity phenomenon 
should be accepted as part of the rules of the game.  In Part III it has been shown that
the drive towards a homogeneous-interests bankruptcy regime appears to be utopian.
Reality proves that concentrated banking markets necessitate a heterogeneous-
164 Cf. Bankruptcy Code § 1124 (providing that any alteration of the legal, equitable and 
contractual rights to which a claimant is entitled renders that claim as impaired).
165 See Part III.A supra.
166 The rationales for according priority to secured creditors while denying a preferable treatment 
from unsecured creditors have been analyzed at length in the literature. For a concise summary of the 
leading theories justifying the seniority of secured credit see Barry E. Adler, Secured Credit Contracts, 
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 405-410 (vol. III, P. Newman ed., 
1998).
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interests bankruptcy regime.  Among such potential regimes, the non-cash auction 
regime proves superior.167
D. Enhancing Collective Decision Making
Voting on the competing bids in a non-cash auction allows all old creditors of the 
debtor firm to opine on each bid and to declare the one mostly favored by them.  In 
concentrated banking economies, a creditors' voting necessarily means (re)turning to 
the voice of the dominating bank.  As explained, that bank is invariably the senior 
secured prebankruptcy creditor of the debtor firm.168  Thus, an encounter between a 
bidder and the dominating bank is unavoidable.  This eventual encounter begs the 
question: what then has been gained by utilizing non-cash auctions?  The underlying 
rationale of preferring non-cash auctions is to facilitate bids that are independent of
bank financing and the banks' ultimate control.169  But this rationale seems to be 
completely eroded by the banks' effective influence over the outcome of the auction in 
their capacity as senior creditors.  In other words, what non-cash auctions seem to 
successfully avoid apparently backfires as the banks, in their capacity as 
prebankruptcy creditors of the debtor firm, vote on the actual non-cash bids.  And yet, 
this is not the case.  Non-cash auctions can make a difference and enhance an auction 
resolution of financial distress.  A vote on non-cash auction bids is more complex 
than straight forward cash bids financed by a bank.  Financing a cash bid effectively 
makes the bank the sole decider of the actual winning bid and the value available for 
distribution to the creditors as a result thereof.170  By contrast, in non-cash auctions, 
the bank is one of a whole group of creditors voting on the bids made.  Obviously, as 
a creditor of the firm the bank is entitled to voice its opinion on a modification of its 
rights.  But so do the other creditors.  Realistically, considering the bank's position as 
the major supplier of credit and the collateral securing its claim, the bank has a 
significant and influential position within the framework of the voting process.  
However, other creditors, whose claims are also at stake in the bankruptcy of the 
167 My heterogeneous interests voting on non-cash bids shares the views expressed in both the 
AHM Proposal and HLLM Proposal that non-cash bids for the firm enhances value maximization of 
the firm compared to cash auctions, but part ways from these Proposals concerning the capital structure 
of the reorganizing firm prior to voting on the bids received. While these proposals envisage an all 
equity (or, in the lexicon of HLLM: Reorganization Rights) firm, my proposal follows the 
prebankruptcy combination of debt and equity structure of the firm's capital.
168 See Part III.B.1 supra.
169 See Part IV.A supra.
170 See AHM, supra n. 59,  at 871.
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common debtor firm, voice their opinions on the various bids as well.  In a non-cash 
auction, the winning bid is determined by a democratic process, which gives 
appropriate weight to all relevant claims, not just the bank's senior claim.  The voting 
process counterbalances the bank's market advantage by imposing a legal proceeding 
which induces a collective decision rather than a dictation of a result which is most 
convenient for the bank's own interests.171
Voting on non-cash auctions enjoys the virtue of a collective decision-making.  To 
implement this ideal practically, though, the voting procedure taking place in a non-
cash auction regime must be one which negates a de facto absolute control of the 
voting outcome by any single creditor in general and the dominating bank in 
particular.  Because their interests are in conflict with one another, as a result of their 
divergent distributive priorities, different creditors are classified separately and vote 
within classes.172  Secured creditors are classified separately.173  Analytically, each 
secured creditor constitutes a class of its own, based on its unique and specific interest 
in the firm's assets.  By contrast, unsecured creditors are usually classified together in 
a single class.174 It follows, then, that to achieve the collective decision-making goal, 
any law implementing a non-cash auction bankruptcy regime must overcome the 
potential veto power the banks may possess through their separate classification.  
Overcoming a veto vote may be accomplished through a prototypical cram-down 
provision.175 To be sure, cram-down is no absolute priority rule negating measure.176
The non-cash auction regime would follow the conventional APR distribution order.  
171 For the distortions caused by allowing the banks to effectively serve as the sole decision 
makers on bids for the firm, see Part III.B.2 supra.
172 7-1122 Collier on Bankruptcy - 15th Edition Revised P 1122.03 (2004) ; Bruce A. Markell, 
Clueless on Classification: Toward Removing Artificial Limits on Chapter 11 Claim Classification, 11
Bank. Dev. J. 1, 15-17 (1994/1995); Scott F. Norberg, Classification of Claims Under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code: The Fallacy of Interest Based Classification, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 119, 119-120 
(1995)
173 Thomas C. Given & Linda J. Philipps, Equality in the Eye of the Beholder -- Classification of 
Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 735 , 757 (1982) ; Scott F. Norberg, 
An Analysis of Developments in Bankruptcy Law: The National Bankruptcy Review Commission's 
Recommendation on Classification of Claims in Chapter 11, 18 Miss. C. L. Rev. 411, 413 (1998)
174 Norberg, Id ;  Norberg, supra note 172. 
175 Cf. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b). Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization
Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 Emory L.J. 1009, 1037 (1987); David A. 
Skeel, The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's Contribution Rule Doctrine After Ahlers,
63 Am. Bankr. L.J. 221, 222 (1989)
176 Under current U.S. law, commentators have pointed to the stalling tactics that junior claimants 
and equityholders may employ, as well as to the (pre La Salle) management's exclusivity right to 
propose a plan, even when it distributes value to old equityholders under the "new value" exception, as 
the main concerns for deviation from the absolute priority rule.  See. Lopucki & Whitford, supra n.81,
at  184; Adler & Triantis, supra n.52.
47
The cram-down provision would simply serve as a supplementary judicially directed 
mechanism, aimed at ameliorating the absolute control over the determination of the 
winning bid that the concentrated banks would otherwise obtain.  Cram-down would 
allow the other creditors to bring to the fore, through a judicial proceeding, a 
competing bid, which the banks have ruled out (through their class vote) as "too 
risky".  The cram-down provision is a countervailing measure to the banks' ultimate 
control over the auction's outcome.  It is not meant to bypass the banks' vote, only to 
subject that vote to a judicial check.177  Given the perils that concentrated banking 
causes in corporate bankruptcy, this check is a necessary measure to complement the 
non-cash auction solution.
E. Subtle Antitrust Measures
Despite working within the context of bankruptcy and thus affecting directly 
creditors' rights, non-cash auctions may also serve a broader cause.  Such auctions 
also may be considered a fine measure for combating the perils of tacit collusion in 
concentrated banking.  It has been noted earlier that a major limitation for enforcing 
antitrust law is the costs of detection of anticompetitive practices.  This is the reason 
that explicit cartels are invariably regulated while tacit collusions are somewhat 
beyond the scope of antitrust law.178  In addition, even where the anticompetitive 
practice is detected the enforcement of antitrust law measures entails costly actions, 
such as lawsuits and continuous monitoring of the colluding parties.179  Employing 
subtle competition enhancing measures through other fields of law may prove a 
positive complement to antitrust law in its attempt to combat anticompetitive 
measures such as tacit collusions.  Thus, when the law can overcome an 
anticompetitive measure by adopting alternative mechanisms which obviate the 
dependency on the oligopolists' services, antitrust policy is served.  Such alternative 
measures operate at a low cost.  They encourage economic competition rather than 
177 Several commentators noted that provisions that deny either party an absolute control over the 
outcome of a negotiated process carry the positive potential of enhancing productive and consensual 
outcomes rather than contested one.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Chapter 11, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 219, 220-221 (vol. I, P. Newman ed., 1998); Janger, supra
n.48; Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60 Am. 
Bankr. L.J 69 (1986); Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The 
Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. Law. 441 (1984).
178 See n.104 supra.
179 Warren F. Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 Geo. L.J.
1075 (1980); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the 
Theory of Enforcement, 74 Geo. L.J. 1231 (1986)
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walk the legal path of detecting anticompetitive practice and enforcing penalizing 
measures thereagainst.  Non-cash auctions exemplify such subtle antitrust measures.  
They are a classic illustration of implementing antitrust policy through bankruptcy 
law measures.180  Obviously, achieving the antitrust goals is secondary to meeting the 
primary concerns of bankruptcy law itself.  However, once it has been demonstrated 
that non-cash auctions facilitate the maximization of value to the firm's creditors, 
serving antitrust policy blends integrally with meeting bankruptcy law's own goals.
CONCLUSION
This article addressed the normative approach to bankruptcy law.  The question 
which bankruptcy law model is optimal has occupied the academic literature for many 
years now.  Yet, the various models suggested by leading authorities in this field were 
mostly planted in U.S. grounds.  The literature has largely disregarded the various 
factors which separate different economic regimes.  Countries around the world differ 
in their economic structure.  The financial conditions of a country like the U.S. may 
facilitate effective competition over the financing of market activities, but in other 
countries such competition barely exists.  The article tackled the issue of countries 
where effective competition over financing is hardly existent and the ramifications of 
such financial constraints on the resolution of corporate bankruptcy.  The article 
approached the phenomenon of concentrated banking economies as a given structure
of many economies around the world.  It showed, however, that even one who 
considers concentrated banking as overall efficient cannot ignore the concrete 
hazardous ramifications which concentrated banking holds for financing cash bids for 
distressed firms.  This article established the anticompetitive measures which 
oligopolistic banks are likely to use to frustrate value-maximizing cash bids.  The 
banks are suspects of unilaterally imposing caps on their financing of any potential 
cash bid for the firm, caps which inter alia are a function of those banks' 
prebankruptcy senior secured claims.  The cash constraint problem from which 
players in concentrated banking economies suffer is exacerbated by the corresponding 
180 It is common to find lawmakers influencing the practice in a certain field of law by planting 
carrots or sticks in another field. The classic field of law utilized for the creation of incentives to 
practice the law in a certain way favored by the lawmakers is taxation. See S. S. Surrey & P. McDaniel, 
TAX EXPENDITURES, 99-117 (Cambridge, 1985); John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer 
Taxation, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 28-31 (2002); Kurt Hartmann, The Market for Corporate Confusion: 
Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for Corporate Control Through The Federal Tax Code, 6 
DePaul Bus. L.J. 159 (1994).
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underdevelopment of local stock markets in such economies.  Thus, when Douglas 
Baird has called for implementing a cash auction bankruptcy regime he clearly did 
not have concentrated banking economies in mind.  When bidders lack the requisite 
cash, and their only source for obtaining it is an oligopoly group of banks, the cash 
auction will fail to promote the goal of efficiency.  Baird's proposal is simply 
inadequate for such economies.  Likewise, the innovative bankruptcy proposals of 
Bebchuk, AHM and HLLM, all of which call for converting the prebankruptcy rights 
of creditors and shareholders to newly issued options to buy out the firm's equity 
rights, also fall short due to the lack of available cash for exercising the buy-out 
options or for acquiring those rights through the market.
In view of the incompatibility of these cash consuming, market oriented, models 
of corporate bankruptcy this article proposed to adopt an alternative market oriented 
bankruptcy model.  It proposed employing a non-cash auction regime, under which 
bidders would be encouraged to bid for the control of the firm while reducing the 
bidders' dependency on bank financing.  Cutting the Gordian knot between all bidders 
and bank financing is essential for facilitating efficient market-based bankruptcies in 
concentrated banking economies.  The outcome of a non-cash auction would be 
determined by a vote of the various classes of claimants, in a manner similar to the 
current procedure of U.S. Chapter 11.  Effectively, this model would prove to be a 
perfected La Salle bankruptcy scheme.  In all bankruptcy cases, internal and external 
bidding would be invited, thus ensuring a healthy competition which would maximize 
the ex post value of the firm, to the benefit of all claimants.
